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 This dissertation titled “Essays in Corporate Governance” contains two essays in matters relating 
to corporations and their governance practices.  The titles and the abstracts of the two papers 
are presented below. 
 
Does it pay to play? Political donations around mergers and acquisitions 
This study focuses on corporate political donations around mergers and acquisitions of U.S. 
firms.    I track the political contributions made by firms involved in large U.S. mergers from 2000 
to 2010 by focusing on four different ways that corporations contribute to political parties: 
political action committee (PAC) donations, PAC to PAC donations, soft money and 527 
committees’ donations, and individual donations.  Consistent with politicians’ rent-seeking 
behavior, I document evidence that participants in mergers and acquisitions alter their 
donations around these deals in attempts to influence the deal outcome and appear to do so 
particularly around deals where donations may be more effective.  Overall, I find that large 
shifts in donations around mergers and acquisitions increase the likelihood of deal completion.  
After controlling for firm and merger characteristics, the firms involved in mergers make more 
political contributions after a deal is announced compared to periods before the announcement 
and after a deal is finalized.  This behavior is more pronounced when the deal continues for an 
extended period of time, which is consistent with the notion that these deals may face more 
regulatory hurdles and donations may likely impact the merger outcome. Furthermore, I 
document higher bidder and target abnormal donations after a merger announcement when 
the market reaction is negative. Finally, donation intensity increases when the merger would 
cause the industry concentrations ratios to increase above normal.  These results collectively 
suggest that firms aggressively manage political donations around merger and acquisition 
activity, potentially indicating agency conflicts driving these donations.  
 
Director Alpha: An objective measure of director contribution 
The appointment of high value directors is associated with immediate positive market 
reaction, and the presence of high value directors in the board enhances long-run firm value. 
We identify the contribution of directors by alpha, or the abnormal risk-adjusted stock returns 
that are generated in other firms on whose boards they sit.  We find that investors react 
 positively when high alpha directors are appointed to high alpha boards.   CEOs and individuals 
with MBA or CPA designations are more likely to be high value directors. We find that high alpha 
directors contribute significantly to firm value. For the typical firm, our parameter estimates 
imply that replacing a negative alpha director with a positive one is associated with a 3.3% 
improvement in firm value. 
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Does it pay to play?  
Political donations around mergers and acquisitions 
 
This study focuses on corporate political donations around mergers and acquisitions of U.S. 
firms.    I track the political contributions made by firms involved in large U.S. mergers from 2000 
to 2010 by focusing on four different ways that corporations contribute to political parties: 
political action committee (PAC) donations, PAC to PAC donations, soft money and 527 
committees’ donations, and individual donations.  Consistent with politicians’ rent-seeking 
behavior, I document evidence that participants in mergers and acquisitions alter their donations 
around these deals in attempts to influence the deal outcome and appear to do so particularly 
around deals where donations may be more effective.  Overall, I find that large shifts in 
donations around mergers and acquisitions increase the likelihood of deal completion.  After 
controlling for firm and merger characteristics, the firms involved in mergers make more political 
contributions after a deal is announced compared to periods before the announcement and after 
a deal is finalized.  This behavior is more pronounced when the deal continues for an extended 
period of time, which is consistent with the notion that these deals may face more regulatory 
hurdles and donations may likely impact the merger outcome. Furthermore, I document higher 
bidder and target abnormal donations after a merger announcement when the market reaction 
is negative. Finally, donation intensity increases when the merger would cause the industry 
concentrations ratios to increase above normal.  These results collectively suggest that firms 
aggressively manage political donations around merger and acquisition activity, potentially 
indicating agency conflicts driving these donations. 
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Introduction 
 
On January 5, 2011, 97 Congressional representatives signed a letter1 urging Federal 
Communications Commission to approve the Comcast-NBC Universal merger.  The letter read 
“…No one can question the extensive and comprehensive examination this transaction has 
received…“  The representatives reminded the FCC that “… Any further delay in your agency's 
review process, and any further efforts to laden the transaction with formal regulatory 
requirements, could undermine much needed jobs and investment...”  
 
This was not a unique instance of the Congressional representatives getting involved in 
a merger of corporations – however the number of representatives signing this letter is the 
largest to date. The Federal Election Commission (FEC) information shows that 84 of these 97 
Representatives received campaign contributions from Comcast, the bidder, in the immediate-
past election cycle. The merger was valued at $13.75 billion where Comcast would own 51% and 
GE would own 49% of NBC Universal if the proposed merger went through. 
 
The U.S. political system is largely regarded to be generally independent compared to 
other governments even with evidence of large and ever-increasing corporate spending in 
elections in every election cycle (Kaufmann et al., 2003). Studies have linked political spending 
by corporations to agency issues within the firm (Aggarwal et al. 2012), and hence they are 
value-destroying.  Other studies have found a positive relation between corporate political 
spending and the cross-section of higher future returns (Cooper et al, 2010). These studies have 
conflicting evidence, suggesting that further research is necessary to determine the impact of 
political spending by corporations on their valuation. 
 
The current rule does not require public corporations to disclose their political spending 
to SEC, or obtain approval from its board in making such contributions.  Public company 
executives have a substantial presence (67%) on the board of the intermediaries – e.g. American 
Petroleum Institute, America’s Health Insurance Plans, and National Association of 
Manufacturers of the U.S. - through which the majority of corporate political spending are   
 
1
http://www.ip-watch.org/weblog/wp-content/uploads/2011/01/11-01-05comcasthouseletter.pdf  
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channeled.  It is very difficult for shareholders to track the political spending by the corporations 
in this opaque framework leading to possibilities of agency issues in the political contribution of 
the corporations.  There has been a growing demand of such disclosure, especially coming from 
the large fund managers, in recent times (Guerrera, 2007).  The number of shareholder 
proposals requesting disclosure of political spending has been on the rise in the last few years.  
During the 2012 proxy season 13% (71) of all proposals that appeared on public corporation 
proxy statements were related to this topic (Bebchuk and Jackson, 2012).  This movement for 
better access to information on corporate political spending is consistent with the requirement 
that the SEC’s rules protect investors and promote efficiency.   
 
Recent studies (Aggarwal et al., 2012, Goldman et al., 2009, Shon , 2010) attempt to find 
the underlying reasons for corporate political spending as corporations do not have political 
preferences per se.  However, legislative, political and regulatory changes affect the way 
corporations operate and also their current and future financial performance.  Although there is 
no evidence of corporate contributions directly influencing voting outcomes, there is clear 
evidence that funds raised by candidates and political parties help them win elections.  Studies 
(Romer and Snyder, 1994, Ansolabehere, 1999) show that party leaders, committee chairs and 
other influential legislators raise substantially larger funds compared to others. Political 
spending by corporations may influence the political process in ways that improve firm 
performance and reduce hurdles in its operations.  The managers, alternatively, may have their 
own agenda and use corporate funds to promote their own political and financial objectives. 
Irrespective of the underlying reason, corporate spending is expected to be high for 
corporations relying on legislative, regulatory and political support for its functions – especially 
in situations where its actions has the potential to come under increased regulatory and 
legislative scrutiny in addition to reactions by the market.  Large mergers, which may be value-
destroying for the bidder’s shareholders and harmful to competition in the industry, are such an 
example. 
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Mergers and acquisitions are especially fraught with agency problems for the companies 
involved.  In addition, Department of Justice (DOJ) and Federal Trade Commission (FTC) are the 
responsible agencies assigned to determine if a proposed merger would harm consumers.  The 
Bureau of Competition and the Bureau of Economics (both agencies of FTC) are entrusted to 
prevent mergers which reduce competition and lead to higher prices, lower quality goods and 
services, or less innovation.  Proposed large mergers and mergers in concentrated industries are 
thus often subject to intense scrutiny of FTC and DOJ. This paper examines political spending by 
corporations involved in large merger and acquisition deals in the U.S.   
 
The existing studies on mergers and acquisitions state that bidder returns around the 
merger announcement is lower than target returns.  Moellar et al. (2004) reports a size effect of 
bidder returns where larger bidders face a higher negative announcement return.  Becher 
(2000) finds that bank mergers during 1990s realize abnormal positive returns for both the 
bidders and targets in certain event windows. Chang (1998) reports positive abnormal returns 
for bidders of privately held target firms.  The abnormal announcement returns are higher for 
bids involving payment by stocks.  Fuller et al (2003) argue that bidders in a relatively illiquid 
market for assets (private firms and subsidiaries) do not pay as high a price for a firm as a public 
target firms.  
 
I use SDC Platinum to identify large merger and acquisition bids, completed and 
withdrawn, where both the bidder and the target are U.S. companies.  I collect deal-related 
information and identify the relationship between large merger participants and their political 
donations behavior.      
I use comprehensive data on corporate political donations from the Center for 
Responsive Politics (CRP).  The data spans from 2000 to 2010 and include all four main types of 
donations: Political Action Committee (PAC) donations, PAC to PAC donations, Soft money and 
527 Committees’ donations, and donations by individuals affiliated with a company.  I use all 
types of donations to aggregate the political spending pattern of U.S. public corporations 
involved in large mergers.         
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Consistent with politicians’ rent-seeking behavior, I document evidence that participants 
in mergers and acquisitions alter their donations around these deals in attempts to influence the 
deal outcome and appear to do so particularly around deals where donations may be more 
effective – larger deals and deals in more concentrated industries.  Overall, I find that large 
shifts in donations around mergers and acquisitions increase the likelihood of deal completion.  
Tests confirm that firms involved in mergers make more political contributions after a deal is 
announced compared to periods before the announcement and after a deal is finalized.  I also 
observe that for deals continuing for an extended period of time, which is consistent with the 
notion that these deals may face more regulatory hurdles and donations may likely impact the 
merger outcome, bidders’ altered donation pattern is more pronounced.  Furthermore, I 
document higher bidder and target abnormal donations after a merger announcement when 
the market reaction is negative.  These results collectively suggest that firms aggressively 
manage political donations around merger and acquisition activity, potentially indicating agency 
conflicts driving these donations. 
 
The remainder of the article is organized as follows.  In Section I, I provide information on 
studies done on corporate political spending and its effects on firm value and detail the 
contribution of this paper.  In Section II, I describe the data used in the analysis and detail the 
construction of the firm political contribution measures and different time frames used in this 
study.  In Section III, I derive the hypotheses.  Section IV presents the results that document the 
evidence in support of the hypotheses.  Section V concludes the paper.   
 
I. Literature Review 
 
This paper contributes to a growing literature that examines the intersection of finance and 
politics.  There are two distinct avenues of current research looking into corporations’ 
connectedness to politics.  One strand of studies examine connectedness arising from explicit 
relations between corporations and politicians (e.g., politicians sitting on the board or an 
executive of the corporation running for a political office), and the second strand looks into firm 
contributions to a politician/party’s coffers.  Studies in the first strand find that explicit relations 
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are important to firm value.  Faccio (2006) documents a positive stock price reaction to the 
announcements of (i) a politician joining a firm’s board, and (ii) a company’s executive or large 
shareholder running for public office.  Financially distressed firms are more likely to receive 
government bailouts when they have a company executive or a large shareholder in an 
important government position (Faccio et al., 2006).    
Corporate connections to politics arising from political spending are also important to 
firm value.  However, studies have found contradicting results for corporate political spending 
effects on firm value, market reaction and performance.  Cooper et al (2010) find that corporate 
spending support for candidates is positively and significantly correlated with the cross-section 
of future returns.  Roberts (1990) finds that the contributing firms’ market value fell after the 
death of U.S. Senator Henry Jackson.  Several papers (Goldman et al, 2009, Jayachandran, 2006, 
Knight, 2006) present evidence that a Republican candidate win (loss) is associated with positive 
(negative) stock price reaction for firms making significantly larger contribution to Republican 
party/candidate and a negative (positive) stock price reaction for Democratic-leaning firms.  
Conversely, Aggarwal et al (2012) find that a $10,000 increase in corporate spending is 
associated with a reduction of in annual excess returns of 7.4 basis points.  The study also finds 
that political donations are symptomatic of agency problems within firms.  Still, a study by 
Ansolabehere et al. (2004) finds no noticeable return differences across donor and non-donor 
firms for events surrounding the Bi-Partisan Campaign Reform Act in 2002 which banned soft 
money donations. 
Overall, the existing research is yet to draw a conclusion about the impact of corporate 
political spending on the firm value and market reaction.   While most of the studies focus on 
election cycles and effect of political spending on market reactions and firm values after each 
cycle, this paper examines political spending from a different angle. I study political spending 
behavior of U.S. public firms, both bidders and targets, involved in large mergers to find any 
discernible changes in their donation pattern around the merger.  Large mergers are often not 
only value-destroying for the bidder shareholders but also financially very beneficial for the top 
executives of the involved firms.  So while regulatory bodies and legislators have their 
responsibilities to ensure consumer protections and continued competition in the industry, the 
managers have their own motive for ensuring the completion of a merger deal.  Although there 
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have been some studies which connect corporate political donations  and mergers (Snyder, 
1990; Snyder, 1992; Hart, 2001; Fisman, 2001), no study has yet examined the changes in 
spending behavior by the merger participants around the deal announcement.  
 
This paper contributes to the extant literature by portraying a shift in firms’ political 
donation patterns around large merger announcements.  While most of the extant literature 
examines only some of the avenues by which firms can make political donations (either soft 
money donations, or PAC donations), I study all forms of donations (PAC donations, PAC to PAC 
donations, Soft money and 527 Committees’ donations and individual donations) to determine 
the change in aggregate spending behavior of the corporations involved in large mergers.  The 
increased donation around the merger may result from agency issues within the firms where the 
managers are fulfilling their own objectives, or it may result from companies making investment 
in political capital that should generate positive returns for the firm.  I show that large shifts in 
donations around mergers and acquisitions increase the likelihood of deal completion. This 
study depicts that increased donation behavior is more pronounced when the deal continues for 
an extended period of time, which is consistent with the notion that these deals may face more 
regulatory hurdles and donations may likely impact the merger outcome. The univariate results 
in this study indicate that donation intensity increases when the merger would cause the 
industry concentrations ratios to increase above normal.  Furthermore, I document higher 
bidder and target abnormal donations after a merger announcement when the market reaction 
is negative.  These results collectively suggest that firms aggressively manage political donations 
around merger and acquisition activity, potentially indicating agency conflicts drive these 
donations.   
 
II. Political Spending Data 
 
I collect large U.S. mergers and acquisitions information from SDC Platinum.  I include all U.S. 
mergers and acquisitions exceeding $4 billion in the sample to get an initial sample of 667 deals.  
After excluding the repurchases, spin-offs and involvement of foreign bidders in the deal, my 
final dataset is comprised of 269 large deals between 2000 and 2010 where all the parties in the 
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announced merger are U.S. firms.  I do not keep the mergers and acquisitions involving foreign 
bidders, or U.S. subsidiaries of foreign bidders as Federal Election Commission bans foreign 
companies from contributing, donating or spending funds in connection with any federal, state, 
or local election in the United States, either directly or indirectly.  In the final sample of 269 
mergers and acquisitions over an 11 year span, there are 232 unique bidders and 217 unique 
targets. 
             
I collect political contribution data from the Center for Responsive Politics (CRP) site.  
CRP has created its database based on Federal Election Commission (FEC) filings that links the 
different kinds of donations to the donor’s affiliated organization.  These data covers donations 
to candidates for federal offices and national parties.  They do not include donations to 
candidates for state level offices.  Donations of subsidiaries are aggregated at the level of the 
parent firm.  
 
Corporations and their executives contribute to politics through four different channels: 
donations to Political Action Committees (PACs), donations from one PAC to another (PAC to 
PAC), soft money donations (till 2002) and donations through 527 committees (after 2002 
banning of soft money), and donations from individuals who list the corporation as their 
employer.  PACs are set up by the company, solicit donations from employees, aggregate funds, 
and make contributions to candidates, parties and other PACs.  PAC contributions do not come 
directly from company resources and are regulated not to exceed $5,000 for each candidate in 
any election cycle.  However, PACs may make unlimited expenditures independently of a 
candidate or political party.  These committees have to report their quarterly spending 
statements to the FEC. 
 
Compared to PACs, soft money donations are unlimited political contributions to the 
national parties for party-building activities and non-party-specific advertising.  These donations 
are made directly from the company funds.  In November 6, 2002, soft money donations were 
banned as a result of the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act.  Since then, direct donations from 
corporate funds have switched to tax-exempt 527 committees.  A 527 group is created primarily 
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to influence the selection, nomination, election, appointment or defeat of candidates to federal, 
state or local public office.  There are no upper limits on contributions to 527s and no 
restrictions on who may contribute. There are no spending limits imposed on these 
organizations.  These committees, however, must register with the IRS, publicly disclose their 
donors and file periodic reports of contributions and expenditures.    
 
In Citizens United v. Federal Election Commission ruling in January 2010, the U.S. 
Supreme Court held that corporate funding of independent broadcasts in elections cannot be 
limited under the First Amendment thereby striking down the ban on soft money donations.  
With this verdict, corporations currently enjoy the freedom of spending an unlimited amount of 
political dollars on elections.  This judgment has resulted in the creation of independent-
expenditure only committees, popularly known as,   ‘Super PACs’. They may engage in unlimited 
political spending independent of the campaigns.  Also unlike traditional PACs, they can raise 
funds from corporations, unions and other groups, and from individuals, without legal limits and 
without revealing the source of the funds.  This gives the corporations an avenue to make 
political spending without having to reveal it.  However, as this study spans only up to 2010, 
before super PACs became a major channel for firms to make political donations, the 
unavailability of corporations’ political donations through super PACs does not affect the results. 
 
Individual donations are made directly.  Individual donors are asked to disclose their 
primary employer if the amount of donation exceeds $200.  Although individual donations do 
not use corporate funds or reflect preferences of the firm’s shareholders or executives, they still 
are an avenue for firms’ stakeholders to make their voice heard to the candidate and the 
political party. 
 
I aggregate all these four types of avenues of political donations for the corporations 
when these contributions are recorded at the FEC.  I then combine the SDC mergers and 
acquisition data with the CRP contribution data.  This results in a unique dataset containing 
political spending of all the bidders and targets in my sample by exact date of spending recorded 
at the FEC.  This allows me to track the donation pattern and the shift in the pattern of the 
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related corporations around the announcement of a merger deal.  I aggregate firm donations by 
different time periods around the merger announcement.  I calculate the annual total political 
donations 2 years and 1 year prior the merger announcement as well as 1 year after the deal is 
finalized – either completed successfully or withdrawn.  These yearly calculations assist me to 
see if the annual political contributions change around merger announcement.  To obtain a 
closer look at the shift of corporate donation behavior around merger, I also calculate total 
donations 90 days, 120 days and 150 days before and after the merger announcement.  I find 
that the median merger deal takes 150 days to complete.  I calculate the corporate political 
donations made after 150 days of merger announcement till the finalization of the merger to 
check if corporations intensify their donations when deal length is longer.  To compare between 
mergers of time periods having different durations, I use annualized donations for each of these 
aggregate donation measures.     
 
I merge the SDC-CRP data with CRSP/Compustat data and build a comprehensive 
database of firm contributions, deal completions and other deal-related variables, annual firm 
characteristics, and returns around merger announcements. 
 
[Insert Table 1 here] 
Table 1 presents the summary statistics of the 269 deals in the sample.  Bidders and 
targets are in the same industry in 45% of the merger bids in the sample.  Deals with multiple 
bidders are withdrawn more frequently than deals with single bidder.  Hostile deals are 
withdrawn more often than completed. Forty two percent of the targets in the sample have 
poison pills.  The fraction of completed deals where target has poison pill is significantly lower 
than withdrawn bids. Bids where stocks are used as mode of payment are withdrawn more 
often. On an average it takes 155 days from the bid announcement for a deal to be finalized– it 
does not vary significantly between completed and withdrawn bids.  Average deal value of the 
sample is $12.3 billion.  Both deal abnormal returns in 3 day window around the bid 
announcement and the speculation spread is positive on an average in the sample.  The table 
also reports that change in Herfindahl Index if bid is successful is 2.28% for the sample deals. 
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[Insert Table 2 here] 
Panel A of Table 2 shows the characteristics of the bidder firms in the sample.  The 
bidder firms are large with average total assets of $98 billion.  The withdrawn bidders use 
significantly more leverage than the completed bidders. The average bidder 3 day cumulative 
abnormal return around the bid announcement is -3 percent. 
Panel B reports bidder political donations.  It shows that bidder annual political 
donations rise in the 2 years prior to bid announcement and reaches the highest during the 
active bid period.  The annual donations decrease after the deal is finalized. I also show 
donations around the bid announcement for the bidder.  Panel B reports an increase in political 
donations 90 days after the bid announcement ($116,331) compared to 90 days prior to the 
announcement ($44,397) on an average.  The same trend is observed for other time frames 
around the bid announcement.  The last row reports annualized political donations beyond 150 
days when active bid period exceeds the median bid period of 150 days.   
 
[Insert Table 3 here] 
 
Panel A in Table 3 shows the characteristics of the target firms in the sample.  The target 
firms are large with average total assets of $75 billion.  The target firms of withdrawn bids are 
significantly smaller than the target firms of completed deals.  The completed targets have 
significantly higher book to market ratio compared to the withdrawn targets.  This confirms that 
targets with high market value are acquired less frequently.  The average target 3 day 
cumulative abnormal return around the bid announcement is 13.24 percent and is higher for 
completed targets. 
Panel B reports target political donations.  It shows that target annual political donations 
significantly rise during the bid period compared to 2 previous periods.  Panel B reports an 
increase in political donations 90 days after the bid announcement ($70,559) compared to 90 
days prior to the announcement ($27,920) on an average.  The same trend is observed for other 
time frames around the bid announcement.  The last row reports annualized political donations 
beyond 150 days when active bid period exceeds the median bid period of 150 days.  
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III. Hypotheses 
 
Large mergers and acquisitions garner tremendous interest for various reasons.  Department of 
Justice and Federal Trade Commission are vigilant about enforcing anti-trust laws and ensuring 
continuing competition in the industry in the wake of announced large mergers.  Each merger 
and acquisition deal also has to clear the relevant industry commission (e.g., Federal 
Communication Commission, Federal Aviation Administration, etc.).  Besides fulfilling the 
requirements of the regulatory authorities, the participating firms also need respective board 
approval as well as in some cases political sway to ensure successful completion of a merger 
deal.  It is not unfamiliar for large mergers in concentrated industries to be discussed at the 
Senate and/or the House Committees.   
 
Corporations make political donations year round.  Studies show that corporate political 
spending allows them better access to the legislators (Fisman, 2001; Faccio and Parsley, 2009; 
Goldman et al, 2009).  When corporations get involved in a merger that comes under the 
scrutiny of the DOJ, FTC and the relevant commission, donor corporations may call in a favor 
from the legislators to exert control and pursue the regulatory bodies.  I argue that corporations 
increase their political spending around large mergers to get the legislators’ support for the 
merger to be completed.  Steps taken by the legislators can result in the large merger deal being 
successfully completed.   
 
I posit that increased political donations around the merger announcements are likely 
for both value-enhancing and value-destroying merger deals.  Managers of bidder and target 
firms in value-enhancing mergers would want successful deal completions to ensure that 
shareholder wealth is maximized.  The increased political spending around these merger 
announcements is pertinent to investment in political capital.  On the other hand, corporations 
involved in poor and value-destroying merger deals would also increase the intensity of political 
contribution to ensure the successful bid.  The increased intensity of corporate contributions in 
such cases is related to agency issues within the firm.  Regardless of the quality of the bid and 
 - 13 - 
 
the motives of the managers, I argue that corporate political spending shifts around the merger 
announcement and this shift helps in deal completion.       
 
As mentioned before, in my sample, I find that an average merger deal is finalized within 
150 days after the announcement.  Deals taking longer than the average time may be a signal 
for more hurdles and more regulatory challenges for the deal to complete.  I argue that 
corporations engaged in large merger deals with deal lengths longer than average would make 
more political contributions as the deal length gets longer to ensure backing of the legislators.  I 
hypothesize that political spending is higher in the later part of the active bid period, i.e., when 
the deal length goes beyond the average 150 day period compared to early days of the bid 
period. 
 
Merger announcements in highly concentrated industries attract more attention of 
regulators as these deals, if successful, may result in lack of competition in the industry and thus 
raise anti-trust issues.  I argue that increased donations by bidders and targets around the bid 
announcement in large merger deals are more pronounced if they are in a concentrated 
industry or if the industry concentration would change dramatically with successful deal 
completion. 
  
Based on the discussion above, I draw the following hypotheses. 
 
Hypothesis 1: Large shifts in corporate political donations around mergers and acquisitions 
increase the likelihood of deal completion.   
Hypothesis 1a: Bidder corporate political donation escalates as the deal length increases.   
Hypothesis 1b: Large shifts in corporate political donations around mergers and acquisitions are 
more pronounced for mergers in a concentrated industry or where a proposed merger would 
change the industry concentration radically.  
 
The market reaction to merger announcements shows investor sentiment about the 
announced bid.  The current literature finds that bidder stock prices suffer negative 
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announcement reaction if the investors deem the merger to be value-destroying for the bidder 
(Bradley et al, 1988; Lang et al, 1991).  I hypothesize that bidder corporate donations intensity 
increases in the wake of a negative market reaction for a bid announcement.  The need for the 
bidder management to have legislators on their side and apply pressure on the regulators is 
heightened if investors, in general, rate a merger bid to be value-destroying demonstrated by 
negative returns for the bidder surrounding the merger announcement.  I expect higher bidder 
corporate donations immediately after bid announcements when the market reaction to the 
announcement is negative.   
 
Based on the discussion above I draw the following hypothesis. 
 
Hypothesis 2: Bidder abnormal political donations will increase after a merger announcement 
when the market reaction is negative.      
 
IV. Results 
 
I use the raw donation figures reported in Panel B of Table 2 and Table 3 to calculate annualized 
donations around the bid announcement for bidders and targets respectively.  I calculate 
annualized donations by both the bidders and the targets for eight different durations around 
the bid announcement– 150 days before and after the announcement, 120 days before and 
after the announcement, 90 days before and after the announcement, donations during the 
active bid period, and donations made after 150 days of announcement for still-active bids.  
Annualization allows a comparison of corporate political donations for non-matching length of 
periods surrounding the merger announcement.   
[Insert Table 4 here] 
 
Panel A of Table 4 shows that annual corporate political donations by bidders is not 
different for successful versus failed bidders.  I show univariate tests for annual donations for 
four years surrounding the bid: 2 years before bid is announced, 1 year before the bid is 
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announced, annualized donations during active bid period, and 1 year after the deal is finalized.  
Panel B confirms similar results for the targets.   
[Insert Table 5 here] 
 
However, I am interested in the change of donation patterns and their effect on 
successful deal completion, not the raw yearly donations.  Panel A of Table 5 depicts the change 
in political donations around the bid announcement and its association with deal completion.  
Successful bidders are associated with a larger shift in political donation after a bid 
announcement (during active bid period) compared to bidders who withdrew the bid. Successful 
bidders’ shift in donations between the active bid period and 1 year before the bid 
announcement is $34,000 higher than the withdrawn bidders, and this difference is statistically 
significant.  The same conclusion can be drawn for successful bidders shift in donations when 
comparing their donations during the active bid with 2 years prior to bid announcement.  The 
difference in the shift in donations between the successful and withdrawn bidders is higher at 
$52,700, and this is also statistically significant.  Panel B of Table 5 shows the results of similar 
tests for targets.  I find that, like the bidders, successful targets also depict larger shifts in 
donations around the bid announcement.  Successful targets’ shift in donations is $284,000 
more than the failed ones during the active bid period to 1 year prior to merger announcement.  
The shift in donation for successful targets is statistically significantly higher than that for 
withdrawn targets. 
 
[Insert Table 6 here] 
 
I use a multivariate framework for confirming the results in Table 5. The test results of 
the logistic regressions are presented in Table 6.  Panel A presents the results of logistic 
regressions for shift in bidder donations on completed deals.  I use the yearly shift in donations 
around the merger announcement to confirm the results of the univariate setting.  
 
I use control variables to control for the deal, industry, and bidder and target 
characteristics.  Relative deal size is a proxy for the value of the deal and is calculated as a 
 - 16 - 
 
percentage of the total market capitalization of the bidder industry.  I calculate the relative 
target size as total asset of the targets as a fraction of total assets of the bidder.  I coin this as a 
proxy for target size compared to the bidder.  Speculation spread has been used by Jindra and 
Walkling (2003) as a proxy for likelihood of a deal to be completed and is calculated as the 
percentage difference between the bid price and market price one-day after the initial 
announcement.  I also use control variables for deals where bidders and targets are in the same 
industry and where multiple bidders are bidding for the same target.  These deals are likely to 
have more difficulty in successful completion and I expect larger shifts in bidder donations in 
such instances.  I also control for target poison pills and bidder having a merger program.  Target 
poison pills are merger repellant and likely to induce larger bidder donations for a bid to be 
successful.  On the contrary, bidders having a merger program may weaken the results as the 
bidder with a merger program in place may not demonstrate a shift in donation pattern around 
a bid announcement.  I also use controls for deal types (hostile versus friendly) and payment 
types (cash versus stock versus others).  I use the standard SDC definitions in such cases. 
 
Panel A of Table 6 shows the results of the logistic regression where completed = 1 is 
used as the dependent variable.  The primary explanatory variable in all four models presented 
is the shift in donation between two time periods.  Model 1 shows that the shifts in donation 
between periods before the merger (t-1 and t-2) do not cause a significant impact on deal 
completion.  Model 2 confirms that bidders increasing their political spending during the bid 
period (after bid announcement) compared to year before enjoy higher successful bid 
completions   Model 3 confirms that bidders’ increasing their political spending during the bid 
period compared to 2 years before bid announcement result in higher deal completions.  Model 
4 shows that shift in bidder corporate donations between bid period and after deal finalization 
does not affect deal completion.  This is an expected result as I do not expect bidders to 
continue their abnormal corporate donations after a deal is finalized.     
 
Panel B of Table 6 shows the shift in target donation pattern around bid announcement 
and its effect on deal completion.  Target management has incentive for deal completion. 
Alternatively, they might also increase donations to get the legislators on board to halt the 
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merger from going through.  The results in the multivariate framework follow that in the 
univariate setting.  Model 2 of Panel B confirms increased target political donation after bid 
announcement compared to the year before the announcement for successful deal completion 
As only a handful of mergers in my sample are hostile, I conclude that the motives of both 
bidder and target management are congruent in most cases and both increase donations to 
ensure successful deal completion. 
 
I aggregate the changes in donation for each deal, i.e., I add the changes in political 
donations for bidders and targets for each deal and use the logistic regression similar to the 
previous two tests.  The results confirm the conjecture drawn above.  I find that upward shift in 
aggregate donations during active bid period compared to earlier periods increases the odds of 
the deal being completed.   
 
The results in Table 6 confirm the results in Table 5 in the multivariate setting and the 
first hypothesis.  After controlling for firm and merger characteristics, the results in Table 6 
confirm that firms involved in mergers make more political contributions after a deal is 
announced compared to periods before the announcement and this larger contributions 
increases the odds of the merger being completed. 
 
[Insert Table 7 here] 
 
Table 7 indorses that the shift in donation pattern takes place immediately before and 
after the bid announcement.  I look at the shifts in donation from 90 days after the bid is 
announced to 90 days prior to announcement.  Panel A of Table 7 illustrates that shift in bidder 
and target donations for completed deals are significantly higher than those for withdrawn 
deals.  This supports the hypothesis that firms involved in large mergers increase their political 
donation intensity immediately after a bid is announced.          
 
Panel B of Table 7 confirms the finding of Panel A for the bidders in multivariate setting.  
Model 1 (2, 3) uses bidder (target, aggregate) shift in donation between 90 days after and 
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before merger announcement as the primary explanatory variable.  The results suggest that 
increased bidder and aggregate donation around 180 days of the merger announcement 
increases the likelihood of deal completion.  The likelihood of a deal completion rise by 19% 
(11%) for a $10,000 shift in bidder (aggregate) donations from 90 days prior to bid 
announcement to 90 days after the announcement. 
   
 
[Insert Table 8 here] 
In order to test the hypothesis that bidder donations increase as the active bid period 
increases, I test for differences in the bidder donations in the first 90 days of the active bid 
period against political donations made when the deal length goes beyond the median deal 
length of 150 days in our sample.  I use annualized donations to conduct this test as the deal 
length is unique for each deal and to compare donations of two unequal periods, I need to use a 
common time frame.  
 
The results in Panel A in Table 8 illustrates that deal completion is associated with a 
significant rise in bidder corporate donations between the first 90 days after the bid 
announcement and the donations after 150 days of an active bid.  This result supports the 
hypothesis that as the deal takes longer to finalize, increased bidder donations in the latter part 
of the bid period  makes deal completion more likely when the deal faces regulatory and other 
challenges.  Model 1 in Panel B confirms this conjecture in the multivariate setting.  Increased 
bidder donations in the latter part of the active bid period increases the likelihood of deal 
completion – a $10,000 (annualized) increase in bidder donation from first 90 days of bid 
announcement to donations beyond 150 days of active bid period increases the odds of deal 
completion by 0.11 percent. 
 
I do not find similar outcomes for targets in the univariate setting, although in the 
multivariate setting target shift in donation follows the bidder shift in donation and its effects on 
deal completion. Model 2 in Panel B confirms that a la bidders, targets’ increased donations in 
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the latter part of the active bid period increase the likelihood of deal completion.  Model 3 in 
Panel B confirms these results on an aggregate basis for the deal participants.  
 
[Insert Table 9 here] 
 
To test the hypothesis that bidders in concentrated industries make larger political 
donations, I measure the possible changes in industry concentration if a proposed merger is 
completed and find if larger industry concentration requires higher donations for successful deal 
completion.  I calculate the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index for the bidder industry before the deal 
is announced and changes in the Index if the deal is successful.  As the sample of this study 
involves large corporations, the proposed mergers, if successful, have higher probability of 
critically affecting the industry competition.  I define high (low) change in HHI if the proposed 
merger results in changes in HHI larger (smaller) than median changes in HHI for all deals in the 
sample.  In Table 9 I report the results for bidder political donations shift for deal completions.  
The results show that successful bidders in highly concentrated industry or where the proposed 
deal completion would result in high industry concentration engage in larger donation around 
the merger announcement compared to bidders in non-concentrated industry.  Successful 
bidders in concentrated industries donate more during the bid period (Model 1), increase their 
donations around the bid announcement (Model 2), and as the deal length gets longer increase 
the political donations intensity.  These results confirm the hypothesis that larger donations by 
bidders in concentrated industries are associated with successful deal completion.           
                                
[Insert Table 10 here] 
 
I use event studies to test the hypothesis that negative market reaction for a bid 
announcement is followed by an increased corporate donation.  I calculate cumulative abnormal 
returns of the bidder and the target 3 days surrounding the bid announcement (-1, +1).  I define 
low announcement returns for bidder (target) if the bidder (target) CAR is below the median 
CAR in my sample.  In the univariate setting, reported in Panel A of Table 10, I show that low 
announcement returns are associated with high and statistically significant shift in donations for 
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the bidders after the bid announcement.  The targets in the sample do not portray such 
behavior.   
 
In the multivariate setting I use changes in donation as the dependent variable to confirm 
that low announcement returns result in higher corporate donations after the announcement.  I 
use a binary variable for low announcement return as the main explanatory variable.  The binary 
variable takes a value of 1 if announcement returns are lower than the median announcement 
return in the sample.  Panel B and C in Table 20 reports the finding of the OLS regressions.  The 
results in the multivariate setting confirms the results obtained in the univariate setting – the 
increase in bidder corporate spending immediately after the bid announcement is significantly 
higher for bidders having a low announcement return compared to the other bidders.  This 
result provides robust support for the hypothesis that bidders increase their corporate 
donations significantly if the market deems the deal to be poor.  I do not observe any such 
behavior for the targets.              
 
V. Conclusion 
 
Corporate political donation has received enormous attention in the last few years.  Corporate 
spending in the 2012 presidential elections surpassed all previous records and exceeded general 
masses imaginations.  In the wake of Citizens United vs Federal Election Commission ruling by 
the U.S. Supreme Court, corporations now are allowed to make unlimited political spending 
without having to reveal it to SEC or to its shareholders.  Corporate donations can be used as 
spending for political capital where the corporation derives benefits for its stakeholders by 
having legislators support their actions.  Conversely, managers may use corporate funds to 
satisfy their own political and financial goals. 
 
I examine the intersection of politics and finance through large mergers which are 
subject to greater regulations and intense scrutiny not only for the shareholders of the firms 
involved, but also for making certain that anti-trust issues are not breached.  Consistent with 
politicians’ rent-seeking behavior, I find that that corporations involved in large mergers and 
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acquisitions alter their donations around these deals in attempts to influence the deal outcome 
and appear to do so particularly around deals where donations may be more effective.  
Corporate political donations increase significantly immediately after the merger 
announcement. The increase in political spending is more pronounced for deals taking longer 
time to finalize, deals in concentrated industries, and bids experiencing negative market 
reaction after the announcement.  These results collectively suggest that firms aggressively 
manage political donations around merger and acquisition activity, potentially indicating agency 
conflicts driving these donations.         
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Table 1: Deal Characteristics 
        This table reports summary statistics on the characteristics of the 269 sample mergers and acquisitions 
during 2000 to 2010 periods where deals were valued more than $4 billion. Standard SDC classification 
is followed when defining these variables. When the first 3 digits of SIC codes are same for the bidder 
and the target, they are in the same industry. Presence of more than one bidder is defined as multiple 
bidders. A bidder is determined to have a merger program if it carries out 3 or more mergers and 
acquisition bids in a rolling 3 year period. Length of bid measures the number of days from the bid 
announcement to the day the deal is finalized. Deal abnormal returns are net of market cumulative 
abnormal returns over a 3 day window (-1, +1) around the bid announcement date and is market 
value-weighted aggregate of bidder and target abnormal returns. Speculation spread is defined as the 
percentage difference between the bid price and target market price one-day after the initial 
announcement. Changes in Herfindahl measures the percentage change in Herfindahl index if the 
proposed merger bid is successful. The first column reports the mean and median value of all 269 deals 
in the sample, the second column shows the mean and median of all the variables for 234 completed 
bids, and third column reports the withdrawn bids. The asterisks in the third column reflect significant 
difference in values between the completed and withdrawn bids with *, **, *** indicating significance 
at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.        
        
Variable All Deals (269) Completed (234) Withdrawn (35) 
  Mean Median Mean Median Mean Median 
Same Industry 45.69%   45.69%   45.71% 
 
  
Multiple Bidders 10.86%   7.33%   34.29% ***   
Hostile Deal 10.49%   5.17%   45.71% ***   
Poison Pill 42.00%   38.86%   64.00% **   
Merger Program 4.46%   4.70%   2.86% 
 
  
Tender Offer 7.12%   7.76%   2.86% 
 
  
Toehold 2.41%   2.78%   0.00% ***   
Cash Deal 17.47%   17.52%   17.14% 
 
  
Stock Deal 26.02%   24.36%   37.14% *   
Length of Bid (days) 155 150 160 153 147 
 
116 
Deal Value ($ million) $12,359 $7,513 $12,178 $7,383 $13,561 
 
$8,280 
Deal Size/Industry Mkt Cap 1.42% 0.62% 1.36% 0.59% 1.81% 
 
0.76% 
Deal Abnormal Return 7.25% 4.65% 7.38% 4.69% 6.32% 
 
4.40% 
Speculation Spread 7.03% 5.24% 7.17% 5.23% 6.15% 
 
5.41% 
Change in Herfindahl 2.28% 1.63% 2.23% 1.46% 2.56% 
 
2.42% 
Layoffs     30.56% 0.12%       
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Table 2: Bidder Characteristics  
 This table reports summary statistics on the characteristics of the 269 sample bidders during 2000 to 
2010 period where deals were valued more than $4 billion.  The first two columns report the mean and 
median values of the variables for all 269 bidders in the sample. Columns 3 and 4 shows the values for 
bidders where deal was completed.  Columns 5 and 6 report the values for withdrawn bidders. I use 
Compustat to retrieve firm-specific accounting variables. Leverage is calculated as total debt/total 
assets. Market value is calculated by multiplying the number of shares outstanding with the market 
price. All the variables reported reflect end of year values in the year before the merger is announced. 
Abnormal returns are net of market cumulative abnormal returns over a 3 day window (-1, +1) around 
the bid announcement date. The asterisks in the fifth column reflect significant difference in mean 
values between the completed and withdrawn bids with *, **, *** indicating significance at the 10%, 
5%, and 1% levels, respectively.    
        
Panel A 
        Variable All Deals (269) Completed (234) Withdrawn (35) 
  Mean Median Mean Median Mean   Median 
Total Assets ($ million) 98,617 24,032 104,407 26,270 61,565 
 
20,356 
Revenue ($ million) 24,708 13,401 25,384 14,358 20,379 
 
8,619 
EBITDA ($ million) 6,592 2,949 6,723 3,234 5,778 
 
1,991 
Total Debt ($ million) 26,190 5,370 26,446 5,472 24,549 
 
4,074 
Leverage 24.9% 22.9% 23.8% 22.1% 31.8% ** 28.9% 
Market Value ($ million) 53,394 22,420 53,254 24,925 54,274 
 
13,641 
Book to Market 0.54 0.37 0.53 0.38 0.66 
 
0.29 
Return on Asset 12.28% 10.88% 12.35% 11.07% 11.88% 
 
8.95% 
Abnormal Return (-1, +1) -3.08% -2.94% -3.00% -2.96% -3.62%   -2.72% 
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Table 2: Bidder Characteristics  
 This table reports corporate political donations of the 269 sample bidders during 2000 to 2010 period 
where deals were valued more than $4 billion. I use Center for Responsive Politics (CRP) data to 
aggregate all political spending by the bidders in the sample. All four types of donations, namely, 
Political Action Committee (PAC) donations, PAC to PAC donations, Soft money and 527 committees’ 
donations, and individual donations are aggregated and reported here. The table reports bidder 
political donations 2 years before bid announcement, 1 year before bid announcement, donations 
made during active bid period and donation for 1 year after the deal finalizations. I also show donations 
90 days, 120 days, and 150 days before and after the bid announcement. The last row shows the bidder 
political donations during active bid when the bid length exceeds 150 days. This donation is annualized 
by calculating average daily donations during that period and multiplying it by 365.    
       
  Panel B     
       Variable All Deals (269) Completed (234) Withdrawn (35) 
  Mean Median Mean Median Mean Median 
Political Donations: Annual ($)     
 
  
 
  
2 years before announcement 250,341 88,476 243,530 82,409 295,880 102,953 
1 years before announcement 275,451 101,700 271,078 97,504 304,691 117,947 
During Bid (Annualized) 483,235 290,475 485,079 290,475 465,978 224,404 
1 year after finalized deal 435,203 242,805 442,787 260,706 388,294 180,150 
Political Donations: Days ($)     
 
  
 
  
150 days before announcement  73,636 62,325 56,750 60,154 176,254 75,830 
120 days before announcement 58,742 47,605 45,711 47,761 136,927 46,028 
90 days before announcement 44,397 35,862 35,775 34,500 95,129 43,502 
90 days after announcement 116,331 65,250 118,347 68,950 104,154 64,500 
120 days after announcement 169,553 105,884 173,620 105,884 132,943 64,464 
150 days after announcement 210,281 127,890 213,091 127,890 184,994 82,000 
> 150 days after announcement 
(Ann) 438,578 311,824 426,299 311,824 678,012 429,917 
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Table 3: Target Characteristics 
        This table reports summary statistics on the characteristics of the 269 sample targets during 2000 to 
2010 period where deals were valued more than $4 billion.  The first two columns report the mean and 
median values of the variables for all 269 targets in the sample. Columns 3 and 4 shows the values for 
targets where deal was completed.  Columns 5 and 6 report the values for withdrawn targets. I use 
Compustat to retrieve firm-specific accounting variables. Leverage is calculated as total debt/total 
assets. Market value is calculated by multiplying the number of shares outstanding with the market 
price. All the variables reported reflect end of year values in the year before the merger is announced. 
Abnormal returns are net of market cumulative abnormal returns over a 3 day window (-1, +1) around 
the bid announcement date. The asterisks in the fifth column reflect significant difference in mean 
values between the completed and withdrawn bids with *, **, *** indicating significance at the 10%, 
5%, and 1% levels, respectively.    
        
Panel A 
  
 
     
Variables All Deals (269) Completed (234) Withdrawn (35) 
  Mean Median Mean Median Mean   Median 
Total Assets ($ million) 75,916 11,232 83,434 10,852 31,267 ** 17,060 
Revenue ($ million) 13,577 5,452 13,050 5,431 16,708 
 
6,885 
EBITDA ($ million) 3,215 1,013 3,338 996 2,467 
 
1,177 
Total Debt ($ million) 24,844 2,337 27,191 2,304 10,902 ** 4,861 
Leverage 29.2% 28.4% 29.4% 28.6% 28.3% 
 
28.2% 
Market Value ($ million) 18,956 7,458 19,648 7,465 14,948 
 
6,442 
Book to Market 0.05 0.40 0.46 0.40 0.02 ** 0.43 
Return on Asset 11.44% 10.76% 11.21% 10.71% 12.82% 
 
11.14% 
Abnormal Return (-1, +1) 13.24% 10.69% 13.33% 10.69% 12.62%   10.04% 
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Table 3: Target Characteristics 
       This table reports corporate political donations of the 269 sample targets during 2000 to 2010 period 
where deals were valued more than $4 billion. I use Center for Responsive Politics (CRP) data to 
aggregate all political spending by the targets in the sample. All four types of donations, namely, 
Political Action Committee (PAC) donations, PAC to PAC donations, Soft money and 527 committees’ 
donations, and individual donations are aggregated and reported here. The table reports target 
political donations 2 years before bid announcement, 1 year before bid announcement, and donations 
made during active bid period. I also show donations 90 days, 120 days, and 150 days before and after 
the bid announcement. The last row shows the bidder political donations during active bid when the 
bid length exceeds 150 days. This donation is annualized by calculating average daily donations during 
that period and multiplying it by 365.    
       
Panel B 
  
 
    
Variables All Deals (269) Completed (234) Withdrawn (35) 
  Mean Median Mean Median Mean Median 
Political Donations: Annual      
 
  
 
  
2 years before announcement 22,178 4,100 2,113 4,400 156,320 96,135 
1 years before announcement 22,345 500 224 0 170,244 71,750 
During Bid (Annualized) 284,761 162,473 295,764 162,473 181,772 105,029 
Political Donations: Days     
 
  
 
  
150 days before announcement  39,874 34,350 26,569 29,650 107,509 79,500 
120 days before announcement 33,819 30,129 23,351 27,250 85,287 50,590 
90 days before announcement 27,920 21,580 19,991 20,484 67,218 39,290 
90 days after announcement 70,559 43,578 73,342 43,578 43,431 26,486 
120 days after announcement 91,971 52,485 95,172 52,485 60,766 37,914 
150 days after announcement 113,689 62,646 118,077 62,646 72,611 50,109 
> 150 days after announcement 
(Ann) 270,117 192,113 272,693 192,113 219,898 64,277 
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Table 4: Annual Political Donations and Deal Completions 
     This table depicts the relation of annual donations with deal completion. Panel A reports this relation 
for bidders and Panel B reports the relations for targets. Bidder political spending for successful and 
withdrawn bids are reported here in four time durations - 2 years prior to bid announcement, 1 year 
prior to announcement, during the active bid period (annualized), and 1 year after the deal is 
effective. Row 3 reports the difference of annualized donations between the successful and 
withdrawn bidders. Row 4 reports the p-values of the differences. In Panel B, target political spending 
for successful and withdrawn bids are reported in three time durations - 2 years prior to bid 
announcement, 1 year prior to announcement, and during the active bid period (annualized). Row 3 
reports the difference of annualized donations between the successful and withdrawn bidders. Row 4 
reports the p-values of the differences. 
     Panel A: Bidder 
     Deal Completion t-2 (announce) t-1 (announce) During bid  t+1 (effective) 
No 295,880 304,691 465,978 388,294 
Yes 243,529 271,078 466,364 442,787 
Difference (Yes - No) -52,351 -33,613 386 54,493 
p-value 0.54 0.70 1.00 0.66 
     
     Panel B: Target 
 
     Deal Completion t-2 (announce) t-1 (announce) During bid  
 No 156,320 170,244 181,772 
 Yes 2,114 224 295,764 
 Difference (Yes - No) -154,206 -170,020 113,992 
 p-value <.0001 <.0001 0.03 
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Table 5: Shift in Donations  
     This table shows the increases in political donations across two periods and its association with deal 
completion. Panel A shows the results for the Bidders. The first column on Panel A shows the 
increased donation from 2 year before bid announcement to 1 year before announcement for 
successful bidders and withdrawn bidders. Column 2 shows the change in donation during bid period 
(annualized) and 1 year prior to donation. Column 3 shows the change in donation during bid period 
(annualized) and 2 years before the announcement. Column 4 reports the difference of donations 
during bid period (annualized) and 1 year after the deal is finalized. Row 3 reports the difference of 
increased donation for the successful and withdrawn bidders. Row 4 reports the p-values of the 
differences.      
     Panel A: Bidder Donation Shift  
 
 
   Deal Completion t-1 vs t-2  During Bid vs t-1 During Bid vs t-2 During Bid vs 
t+1 
No 8,811 161,287 170,098 77,684 
Yes 27,549 195,286 222,835 23,577 
Difference (Yes - No) 18,738 33,999 52,737 -54,107 
p-value 0.24 0.02 0.01 0.29 
     Panel B shows the results for the Targets in the sample. The first column on Panel B 
shows the increased donation from 2 year before bid announcement to 1 year before 
announcement for completed targets and withdrawn targets. Column 2 shows the 
change in donation during bid period (annualized) and 1 year prior to donation. 
Column 3 shows the change in donation during bid period (annualized) and 2 years 
before the announcement. Row 3 reports the difference of increased donation for the 
successful and withdrawn bidders. Row 4 reports the p-values of the differences. 
 
     Panel B: Target Donation Shift  
 
 
 
   Deal Completion t-1 vs t-2 During Bid vs t-1 During Bid vs t-2 
 No 13,924 11,528 25,452 
 Yes -1,889 295,540 293,651 
 Difference (Yes - No) -15,813 284,012 268,199 
 p-value 0.41 0.01 0.09 
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Table 6: Logistic Regression for Shift in Corporate Political Donation 
         This table reports the results of logistic regression where Completion = 1 is the dependent variable. 
Completion takes a value of 1 for completed mergers and acquisitions and takes a value of 0 for 
withdrawn mergers and acquisitions. Panel A presents the results for the bidders. Panel B presents the 
results for the targets. Panel C presents the results for the deal by aggregating bidder and target shift 
in donations. The primary explanatory variables are changes in political donations between yearly time 
periods. Model 1 uses changes in donation between 1 year before merger announcement and 2 years 
before merger announcement as the explanatory variable.  Model 2 uses changes in donation 
between ‘during’ bid period (annualized) and 1 year before merger announcement as the explanatory 
variable. Model 3 uses changes in donation between ‘during’ bid period (annualized) and 2 years 
before merger announcement as the explanatory variable. Model 4 uses changes in donation between 
‘during’ bid period (annualized) and 1 year after the merger is effective as the explanatory variable. 
Relative deal size is calculated as deal value/industry market capitalization. Relative target size is 
calculated as target total assets/bidder total assets. Speculation spread is calculated as the percentage 
difference between the bid price and target market price one-day after the initial announcement. 
Same industry is a binary variable which takes a value of 1 if the first 3 digits of SIC code is similar for 
bidders and targets. Multiple bidder is a binary variable which takes a value of 1 if there are more than 
one bidder trying to acquire the target. Poison pill takes a value of 1 if the target is defined to have a 
poison pill in the year before the bid announcement. A bidder is determined to have a merger 
program if it carries out 3 or more mergers and acquisition bids in a rolling 3 year period. Merger 
program takes a value of 1 in these cases. Deals that are not termed as 'friendly' in SDC is termed as 
hostile and takes a value of 1. Regulated industry takes a value of 1 for companies in 4000 and 6000 
SIC codes. All stock deals takes a value of 1 if the proposed deal involves only stock as the mode of 
payment. The asterisks reflect statistical significance of differences in values between the completed 
and withdrawn bids with *, **, *** indicating significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.     
    
Panel A: Bidders  
         Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Difference in Total Donation     
 
  
 
  
 
  
 t-1 vs t-2 -0.11   
 
  
 
  
 
  
During bid vs t-1     4.04 ** 
 
  
 
  
During bid vs t-2     
 
  5.23 ** 
 
  
During bid vs t+1     
 
  
 
  -0.22   
Relative Deal Size 25.85   39.92   37.77   38.50   
Relative Target Size -0.63   -0.67   -0.53   -0.97   
Speculation Spread -5.35 * -5.38 ** -5.77 ** -15.78 ** 
Same Industry -0.61 * -0.68 * -0.41 * 0.35   
Multiple Bidder -1.00   -0.41   -0.52   -1.45   
Poison Pill -0.92 * -1.20 * -1.19 * 0.28   
Merger Program 10.98   11.40   11.41   9.89   
Hostile -3.81 *** -4.72 *** -4.61 *** -6.13 *** 
Regulated Industry 0.10   0.67   0.60   0.29   
All Stock Deal -0.84   -1.08   -1.26   -0.13   
Intercept 4.50 *** 4.52 *** 4.40 *** 2.73 * 
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Panel B: Targets 
       Variables (1) (2) (3) 
Difference in Total Donation     
 
  
 
  
 t-1 vs t-2 -0.11   
 
  
 
  
During bid vs t-1     5.96 ** 
 
  
During bid vs t-2     
 
  2.11   
Relative Deal Size 26.40   32.84   25.30   
Relative Target Size -0.62   -0.67   -0.57   
Speculation Spread -5.34 * -4.92 * -3.64 * 
Same Industry -0.60 * -0.79 * -0.51 * 
Multiple Bidder -0.99   -1.06   -0.99   
Poison Pill -0.90   -1.09   -0.77   
Merger Program 10.95   11.34   12.11   
Hostile -3.83 *** -4.09 *** -2.66 *** 
Regulated Industry 0.12   0.48   0.19   
All Stock Deal -0.82   -1.16   -0.74   
Intercept 4.46 *** 4.66 *** 6.31 *** 
 
Panel C: Deal (aggregate) 
     Variables (1) (2) 
Difference in Total Donation     
 
  
During bid vs t-1 3.28 ** 
 
  
During bid vs t-2     2.81 ** 
Relative Deal Size 40.77   41.73   
Relative Target Size -0.67   -0.41   
Speculation Spread -5.10 * -6.28 * 
Same Industry -0.71   -0.46   
Multiple Bidder -0.48   -0.12   
Poison Pill -1.22 * -1.10 * 
Merger Program 11.48   11.20   
Hostile -4.61 *** -4.54 *** 
Regulated Industry 0.67   0.74   
All Stock Deal -1.14 * -0.74 * 
Intercept 4.51 *** 4.36 *** 
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Table 7: Immediate Shift in Donation 
       This table presents the shift in bidder and target donation immediately after 
the bid announcement and its association with deal completion. Column 1 in 
Panel A reports the immediate shift in bidder donation after the bid 
announcement. It calculates the difference of annualized donation 90 days 
after the announcement and 90 days before the bid announcement for 
completed bidders and withdrawn bidders. Column 2 in Panel A reports the 
immediate shift in target donation after the bid announcement. It calculates 
the difference of annualized donation 90 days after the announcement and 
90 days before the bid announcement for completed and withdrawn targets. 
Row 3 reports the differences and row 4 reports the p-values of the 
differences. 
    
       Panel A 
    
       
    Deal Completion Bidder Target 
    No 19,600 -85,110 
    Yes 320,227 257,943 
    Difference (Yes - No) 300,627 343,053 
    p-value 0.0032 <.0001 
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Panel B 
This table reports the results of logistic regression where Completion = 1 is the dependent variable. 
Completion takes a value of 1 for completed mergers and acquisitions and takes a value of 0 for 
withdrawn mergers and acquisitions. The main explanatory variable in Model 1 is difference of 
annualized donation 90 days after the announcement and 90 days before the bid announcement for 
bidders. The main explanatory variable in Model 2 is difference of annualized donation 90 days after 
the announcement and 90 days before the bid announcement for targets. The main explanatory 
variable in Model 3 is difference of annualized donation 90 days after the announcement and 90 days 
before the bid announcement for the merger deal where bidder and target donations are aggregated. 
The asterisks reflect statistical significance of differences in values between the completed and 
withdrawn bids with *, **, *** indicating significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 
       Variables (1) (2) (3) 
Difference in Donation (+90 vs -90)     
 
  
 
  
Bidders 12.10 *** 
 
  
 
  
Targets     0.84   
 
  
Deal     
 
  7.70 * 
Relative Deal Size 452.00   177.60   345.70   
Relative Target Size -0.71   -0.60   1.73   
Speculation Spread -19.97 *** -28.56 * -15.59 * 
Same Industry 1.93 * -4.97   -1.51   
Multiple Bidder 0.44 * -5.50   2.42   
Poison Pill -0.20 * 4.68   -0.18 * 
Merger Program 8.67   -3.41   -5.23   
Hostile -11.36 ** -7.96   -14.64 * 
Regulated Industry 2.51   -3.19   -11.17   
All Stock Deal -0.46   -1.82   -11.71   
Intercept 1.95   7.06   7.35   
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Table 8: Shift in Donation in later part of active bid 
   This table presents the shift in bidder and target donation from the early periods after bid 
announcement to the latter part of the active bid and its association with deal completion. Column 1 
in Panel A calculates the difference of annualized donation >150 days after the announcement and 90 
days immediately after the announcement for completed bidders and withdrawn bidders. Column 2 in 
Panel A calculates the difference of annualized donation >150 days after the announcement and 90 
days immediately after the announcement for completed targets and withdrawn targets. Row 3 
reports the differences and row 4 reports the p-values of the differences. 
   Panel A 
   Deal Completion Bidder Target 
No -93,226 -66,190 
Yes 116,580 -24,749 
Difference (Yes - No) 209,806 41,441 
p-value 0.0301 0.43 
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Panel B 
       This table reports the results of logistic regression where Completion = 1 is the dependent variable. 
Completion takes a value of 1 for completed mergers and acquisitions and takes a value of 0 for 
withdrawn mergers and acquisitions. The main explanatory variable in Model 1 is difference between 
bidder annualized donations >150 days after the announcement and bidder annualized donation 90 
days immediately after the announcement. The main explanatory variable in Model 2 is difference 
between target annualized donations >150 days after the announcement and target annualized 
donation 90 days immediately after the announcement. The main explanatory variable in Model 3 is 
difference between aggregate deal annualized donations >150 days after the announcement and 
aggregate deal annualized donation 90 days immediately after the announcement. The asterisks reflect 
statistical significance of differences in values between the completed and withdrawn bids with *, **, 
*** indicating significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 
 
Variables (1) (2) (3) 
Difference in Donation ( >+150 vs +90)     
 
      
Bidders 1.81 ** 
 
      
Targets     2.01 *     
Deal     
 
  2.23 *** 
Relative Deal Size 193.80   94.64   37.27   
Relative Target Size -0.69   -0.46   -0.33   
Speculation Spread -12.04 ** -0.87   -8.15 ** 
Same Industry 0.00   -0.75   -0.32   
Multiple Bidder -0.88 * 5.00   -1.27 * 
Poison Pill -0.35 * 2.22   -0.22   
Merger Program 9.17   8.48   10.27   
Hostile -5.70 *** -10.44 ** -5.35 *** 
Regulated Industry 1.92   5.10   2.20   
All Stock Deal -0.46   -0.85   -1.46   
Intercept 3.60 *** 3.99 * 4.28 *** 
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Table 9: Bidder Donation Shift for Industry Concentration 
    This table reports the changes in bidder donations around the bid announcement for bidders in 
concentrated industry. Changes in Herfindahl-Hirschman Index for the bidder industry are calculated 
conditional on the proposed merger being successful. High change in HHI is identified if the proposed 
merger results in changes in HHI larger than median changes in HHI for all deals in the sample. Column 
1 reports the annualized donations of bidders for high and low changes in HHI. Column 2 reports the 
changes in annualized donations 180 days around the bid announcement for high and low changes in 
HHI. Column 3 presents similar results for changes in donations in active bid periods exceeding 150 
days and first 90 days of the bid announcement. Row 3 reports the differences in donations. Row 4 
reports the p-values of the differences.  
 
   
High Change in HHI for deal 
completion 
During bid period 90 days after - 90 
days before 
>150 days after - 90 
days after 
No (134) 372,124 210,624 353,314 
Yes (135) 562,637 341,601 427,555 
Difference (Yes - No) 190,513 130,977 74,241 
p-value 0.03 0.02 0.07 
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Table 10: Shift in donations and announcement returns 
 
Panel A 
    This table shows the relations between low announcement returns and shift in donation pattern.  
Abnormal returns are calculated by deducting market returns from the stock returns on a day. I 
calculate cumulative abnormal returns for a 3 day window (-1, +1) around the bid announcement. 
Announcement returns lower than the median cumulative abnormal return is defined as low 
announcement return. Column 1 (2) reports the relationship between changes in donation for the 
bidder (target) around 180 days of bid announcement with low announcement return. Column 3 
reports the relationship for the deal where bidder and target abnormal returns are aggregated after 
market-value weighting. Row 3 reports the differences of shift in donations for bidders (targets, deals) 
with low announcement return and those with high announcement returns. Row 4 reports the p-value 
of the differences.  
 
   
 
Bidder Target Deal 
Low Announcement Return 90 days after - 90 
days before 
90 days after - 90 
days before 
90 days after - 90 
days before 
No 270,494 198,898 245,098 
Yes 306,143 242,110 282,112 
Difference (Yes - No) 35,649 43,212 37,014 
p-value 0.09 0.30 0.12 
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Panel B 
       This table reports the results of OLS regressions where change in donation is used as the dependent 
variable. The explanatory variable of interest is a binary variable, low announcement return. Low 
announcement return = 1 when Announcement returns are lower than the median cumulative 
abnormal return in the sample. The control variables are described before.  Model 1 reports the results 
of OLS regression for shift in bidder donation 180 days (+90 vs -90) around the bid announcement. 
Model 2 reports the results of OLS regression for shift in target donation 180 days (+90 vs -90) around 
the bid announcement. Model 3 reports the results of OLS regression for shift in aggregate deal 
donation 180 days (+90 vs -90) around the bid announcement. The asterisks reflect statistical 
significance of the parameter estimates with *, **, *** indicating significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% 
levels, respectively.        
       
Variable (1) (2) (3) 
Low Announcement Return 
 
  
 
  
 
  
Bidder 0.21 *** 
 
  
 
  
Target 
 
  -0.07   
 
  
Deal 
 
  
 
  0.20 ** 
Relative Deal Size 1.81   3.40   3.45   
Relative Target Size 0.00   0.02   0.02   
Same Industry 0.04 * 0.02   0.00   
Multiple Bidder 0.10 ** -0.02   0.08 * 
Target B/M 0.01 * 0.00   0.01   
Poison Pill 0.09 * -0.07   0.16   
Merger Program -0.14   -0.07   -0.21   
Hostile -0.10   -0.21   -0.41   
Regulated Industry 0.03 * 0.10   0.14   
All Stock Deal -0.05   -0.03   -0.08   
Intercept 0.58 *** 0.13 * 0.67 *** 
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Director Alpha: An objective measure of director contribution 
 
 
The appointment of high value directors is associated with immediate positive market 
reaction, and the presence of high value directors in the board enhances long-run firm 
value. We identify the contribution of directors by alpha, or the abnormal risk-adjusted 
stock returns that are generated in other firms on whose boards they sit.  We find that 
investors react positively when high alpha directors are appointed to high alpha boards.   
CEOs and individuals with MBA or CPA designations are more likely to be high value 
directors. We find that high alpha directors contribute significantly to firm value. For the 
typical firm, our parameter estimates imply that replacing a negative alpha director with 
a positive one is associated with a 3.3% improvement in firm value. 
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The purpose of the board of directors is to both monitor and advise the top 
management team to affect value-maximizing outcomes. Key, of course, to this is having a cadre 
of effective directors.  Therefore, a lingering inquiry in the literature has been to determine 
what the characteristics of a high value or “good” director are.  Do “good” directors translate 
into higher firm value?   
When it comes to the evaluation of directors, the prior literature has pointed to 
subjective characteristics such as education, age, gender, or vocation. (Fich, 2005; Linck, Netter, 
and Yang, 2008; Campbell and Frye, 2009; Adams and Ferreira, 2008; Carter et al., 2010). Some 
studies have examined  specific director traits such as number of other boards and the number 
of committees on which a director serves (Fich and Shivdasani, 2006; Ferris et al., 2003; 
Yermack, 2004; Faleye et al., 2011), association with fraudulent activity  (Fich and Shivdasani, 
2007; Uzun et al., 2004) and the number of votes received in an election (Cai et al., 2009). The 
director experience and/or characteristics are intended to capture her ability to improve some 
measure of firm performance.   
While all of these metrics may indirectly measure a director’s (or an entire board’s) 
effectiveness, we contribute to the extant literature by employing a direct measure of a board 
member’s contribution to firm performance.  We examine the alpha, or the abnormal risk-
adjusted stock returns that are generated in other firms on whose boards they sit.   We 
conjecture that directors who are generating positive abnormal performance on other boards 
are able to do so again when appointed to a new board. We classify these “high value” directors 
as “good” directors and posit that they will be able to enhance firm value.   
Using a panel dataset from 1998 to 2008, we find that prior director contribution is 
significantly and economically related to firm value.  The average alpha for both the full board 
and the group of independent board members is associated with higher Tobin’s q.  In 
multivariate analysis, we find that boards comprised of a higher percentage of high value, or 
positive alpha, directors generate higher firm value.  These results control for a board’s busyness 
(Fich and Shivdasani, 2006).  Even when the boards are busy, contribution of board members, as 
measured by alpha, has a strong impact on subsequent firm performance.  Moreover, the 
announcement return for adding new high value directors is higher when the collective 
contribution of board members is also high.  Therefore, our paper provides support for a new 
measure of director contribution which enhances firm value.  
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The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 1 presents a brief review of 
the board of director literature and its relation to the literature on alpha. It also develops 
hypotheses for how the reputation and characteristics of a director can impact firm value.  
Section 2 discusses the sample selection and methodology and provides a description of the 
observations. In Section 3 we examine the relation between the contribution of directors and 
announcement returns and demonstrate how director contribution affects firm value.  We 
conclude the paper in Section 4.  
 
1. Discussion and Hypotheses 
A great deal of attention has been given to identifying high quality directors and boards. 
A large body of evidence suggests that the market reacts favorably to the appointment of 
outside directors (Rosenstein and Wyatt, 1990; Fich and Shivdasani, 2005 and Perry and Peyer, 
2005).  Other studies examine the relation between a board member’s occupation and firm 
value.  For example, Fahlenbrach et al. (2010) find that outside directors who are CEOs do not 
impact the firm’s operating performance, while Campbell and Frye (2009) find that venture 
capitalists improve IPO firm value.    
While certain skills attained in employment by a director may be beneficial to other firms, 
some conjecture that if a director is too busy, she cannot devote enough resources to the firm.  
Fich and Shivdasani (2006) find that boards with busy directors (sitting on three or more boards) 
are associated with poor operating performance and low market to book ratios. Ferris et al. 
(2003), however, find no evidence that multiple directorships harm firm performance.  Ferris et 
al. (2003) also find that directors who serve on boards of large firms are more likely to gain 
additional seats.  These findings are consistent with Guedj and Barnea (2009) who suggest that 
board seats may be accumulated through “connectedness” rather than through performance.  
Indeed, they argue that when a director is not connected, she gains her reputation through 
monitoring skills. However, when a director is highly connected, she provides less monitoring.  
Building on the arguments of Guedj and Barnea, a director may be connected and therefore 
acquire additional board seats through “connectedness” or she may do so through contribution.    
In this paper, we argue that the reputation and contribution of a director are not the 
same at any point in time.  If a director is busy through connectedness, she may not continue to 
contribute to firm performance.  On the other hand if firms are efficient in appointing directors 
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based on their potential to contribute, we expect to  see a higher firm value and positive market 
reaction to such appointments. Directors, in such cases, would be busy due to their ability to 
contribute, not due to their connectedness.  A properly working internal control system should 
require the presence of “high value” directors, where contribution will be observed in higher 
firm value (Fama and Jensen, 1983).  Our paper attempts to relate such high value directors to 
enhanced firm value.  
We argue that director employment and other characteristics may be associated with 
firm value, but are not direct measures of contribution.  Our measure of director contribution is 
simply the alpha (known as “Jensen’s alpha”) as measured from the abnormal return over a risk-
adjusted multi-factor model benchmark.   The extant literature has utilized this measure to 
determine the excess return of a stock.  The measure is widely used in the evaluation of mutual 
fund managers (Barras, Scaillet, and Wermers, 2010; Jensen, 1968; Wermers, 2000).  In the 
mutual fund literature, alpha is associated with the skill of the manager.  In a similar manner, we 
use a firm’s alpha to measure the contribution of a director.     
We conjecture that a board member’s contribution to any firm where she is newly 
appointed can be measured by the success of prior firms on whose boards she serves.   Our 
procedure begins by identifying all directors who serve on multiple boards.  For any one board 
directorship, we compute the alphas for the other companies on whose boards they serve.  For 
each director, his alpha is the average of the alphas of the firms for his other directorships.  
Suppose a director is newly appointed to the board at Firm A and serves on three other boards: 
Firms B, C, and D. The director alpha for Firm A  is simply the average of the alphas for Firms B, 
C, and D.  We suggest that directors on other firm boards that generate above average return 
for those firms are good directors and are capable of boosting another firm’s value by 
membership in that board.  A board’s alpha is calculated by averaging the constituent individual 
directors’ alphas.  Details of this procedure are in Section 2.2. 
Following this logic, the appointment of a “good” director who has contributed on other 
boards should be related to good firm performance and enhanced firm value.  Additionally we 
conjecture that in the presence of a well-functioning labor market such “good” director 
appointments would be rewarded by the market in the immediate short term.  So, we would 
expect to see a positive market reaction to the appointment of high alpha directors.  This leads 
to the two hypotheses in this paper:  
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Hypothesis 1a: Director Appointment Reward Hypotheses:  The market rewards the 
appointment of high alpha directors 
Alternatively, if the market does not value these high alpha directors, we consider the 
following alternative:  
Hypothesis 1b: Director Appointment Not Rewarded Hypotheses:  The market does not 
reward the appointment of high alpha directors 
 
If high value directors are “worth their salt” the market should react positively when a 
firm appoints a high alpha director.  Investors are knowledgeable and can quickly identify the 
potential of such good appointments.  As the investor expectations of the firm rise, so do the 
share prices around the date of the appointment.  This effect would be even stronger if the 
incumbent board has a positive alpha as it would provide the new high-alpha director a 
responsive ground to contribute to firm value through good monitoring and advising.  On the 
other hand such high-alpha director appointments may not have the desired effect in a firm 
where the incumbent board has low (negative) alpha as the appointment may lead to frictions in 
the board room.  We would expect a muted market reaction in such appointments.  
Hypothesis 2a: Director Contribution Hypothesis: Board alpha and long term firm performance 
is positively related.   
Alternatively, if these directors are not of high value, we consider the following alternative:  
Hypothesis 2b: Director Non-Contribution Hypothesis: Board alpha and long term firm 
performance is not related.   
 
The test of director alpha as a measure of director contribution in the firm would 
require the firm to perform better in the long run with the new director on the board.  Better 
firm performance in the long run would be reflected in higher firm value.  We expect that a 
board containing a majority of high-alpha directors will have a high Tobin’s q.  Boards with high 
alpha, those comprised of a larger percentage of high-alpha directors, should also be associated 
with improved long term performance, reflected in higher firm value.   
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2. Sample Selection, Methodology, and Data Description 
2.1 Sample selection 
Our primary data is from Riskmetrics (previously IRRC) from 1998 to 2008.  This data 
identifies director names and characteristics, including ownership and other board seats.  We 
match this data with several other sources.  We use Compustat to collect firm financial 
information, while CRSP provides stock return data.  We collect the announcement date for 
each director appointment using firm proxy statements and Factiva key word searches.1  The 
earliest of the announcement date found is deemed to be the day the news was public.  Firm 
proxy statements filed for each company also provide information about the education of the 
directors, as well as their primary profession, e.g., lawyer or consultant etc. Our final sample 
results in 10,586 firm-year observations and 2,956 new director appointments during the period 
1998 to 2008.   
2.2 Director alpha 
To measure the effectiveness of a director, rather than rely upon subjective measures of 
skill or ability such as education or vocation, we instead focus upon demonstrated performance 
as an objective measure of director ability. In the investment management field, portfolio 
managers oversee investment assets in an effort to produce a return for their clients. In a similar 
fashion, directors oversee and advise CEOs as they manage corporate assets. As is common 
practice in investment management (Carhart, 1997 and Wermers, 2000), we measure the 
efficacy of this oversight by the abnormal performance, or alpha, of the companies the sample 
directors advise and monitor.  
For each director in our sample, we compute an alpha from the twelve-month period 
preceding her current appointment at the sample firm and use that as our proxy for her ability. 
As is standard in the literature [Fama and French (1992, 1993); Carhart (1997)], we compute 
alpha by estimating monthly regressions of the form: 
               (         )                                ( ) 
                                                          
1
 We also use popular search engines like Google.com, Ask.com, and Yahoo.com for announcement dates.   
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where Ri,t is the return on firm i in month t, Rf,t is the three-month treasury bill rate in month t, 
Rm,t is the value-weighted or equally-weighted return on the CRSP market index. SMBt, HMLt, 
and PR1YRt are the returns to zero-investment long-short portfolios formed from small cap 
stocks minus large cap stocks, high book-to-market stocks minus low book-to-market stocks, 
and high momentum stocks minus low momentum stocks, respectively. The value of the αi 
coefficient is indicative of the firm’s average monthly abnormal return in the year preceding the 
director’s  appointment. 
 Just as an investment manager oversees a portfolio of investments, corporate directors 
oversee a portfolio of companies when they hold multiple board seats. Accordingly, we compute 
an alpha for all firms where that director holds a board seat as described above. As the 
additional firms may have varying annual meeting dates, we align the estimation periods of the 
alpha computation for any other board seats so that they terminate prior to the start of the 
director’s board service at the sample firm. This involves, for each outside board seat, selecting 
the annual meeting dates closest to, but not succeeding the meeting date at the sample firm for 
the estimation window.  
While the simplest measure of the director’s overall alpha would be to just compute the 
average of alphas for each board the director sits on, we are cognizant of the fact that firm 
performance in a given period may be influenced by that of the prior period. Consequently, we 
compute Director alpha by including only the alphas for the firms from the other boards on 
which she sits.   Thus, our measure of director quality is not directly influenced by the sample 
observation being analyzed. 
                ∑
  
 
 
   
 
[Insert Figure 1 here] 
Our algorithm is best demonstrated by example. Figure 1 depicts a director serving at 
Firm A for one-year term starting at the December 1999 annual meeting until the following 
year’s meeting in 2000. This director also holds three other directorships with annual meeting 
dates in October, November, and April. The director’s alpha at the sample firm would be 
estimated over the twelve months from January until December of 1999. The outside director 
alpha at Firm B is estimated from November 1998 until October 1999. Correspondingly, Firm C 
 - 48 - 
 
and Firm D outside director alphas are estimated from December 1998 until November 1999 
and May 1998 until April 1999, respectively. Excluding the sample firm board alpha (“director 
own-board alpha”) from the computation, the director’s overall alpha (“director alpha”) is  the 
average of αB through αD. 
2.3 Sample description 
[Insert Table 1 here] 
Table 1 provides the descriptive statistics of the key variables for our sample.  The 
average age of the firm in the sample is 31.88 years, but the large standard deviation depicts 
that age varies widely in our sample.2  The representative firm in the sample has assets of $1.9 
billion.  Firm value is proxied by average Tobin’s q, defined as the market value of firm assets 
divided by their replacement cost.  Following Kaplan and Zingales (1997), we calculate it as 
follows: 
           
              
   
 (1) 
where BVA is the book value of assets, BVE is the book value of equity, DT is the balance sheet 
value of deferred taxes, and MVE is the market value of common equity. Industry-Adjusted 
Tobin’s q is then calculated by subtracting the median q value of all firms that reside in the same 
Fama and French (1997) 48-industry category.   Our sample firms display Tobin’s q of 1.868, 
broadly consistent with values reported in Dittmar and Duchin (2010).  However, a large 
standard deviation in reflects the wide variation in valuations among our sample firms.   The 
mean industry-adjusted Tobin’s q is 0.2514 for our sample firms.3 On average, a sample firm 
generates yearly revenue of $7,013 million and generates 3.3% in profitability in the form of 
Return on assets (ROA).  
In Panel B, we present board characteristics.  The average board is comprised of 
approximately 10 members who are about 57 years old and as a whole own 8.15% of the firm’s 
                                                          
2
 The age is calculated as the earliest from the inception of the firm or its date of inclusion in either the 
CRSP or Compustat databases.   
3
 It is important to note that all industry medians are computed using the universe of firms listed in 
COMPUSTAT and not just those analyzed in the sample. Consequently, it is not a requirement that any of 
our industry-adjusted sample statistics have a median of zero. 
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shares, broadly consistent with Cai et al. (2009) and Cai and Walkling (2010).4  As per the extant 
literature (Fich and Shivdasani, 2006; Coles, Daniel, and Naveen, 2008), outside directors are 
defined as those that are not current or former employees of the firm, are not related to the 
CEO, have no other business deals with the firm other than their directorship, and do not have 
interlocking directorships with the CEO of the respective firm. Approximately 70% of the 
directors meet these criteria.   A board is defined as independent if 50% or more of its directors 
are outside directors, and 83% of boards in our sample are independent.  An outside director is 
identified as busy if s/he sits on three or more boards simultaneously; 14% of the outside 
directors in our sample are busy, consistent with Fich, Starks, and Yore (2010).  Only about 6% of 
the firms in our sample have a “busy board” which is defined as one with 50% or more busy 
directors.  The representative CEO in our sample firms is approximately 56 years old, owns 
around  2% of the shares of the firm, has been the CEO of the firm for about 7 years, and is on 
the director nominating committee in 8% of our sample, consistent with the findings of Fich, 
Starks and Yore (2010).   
[Insert Table 2] 
In Table 2, we summarize the board alpha characteristics and show univariate test 
results of Tobin’s q by segregating the alphas into positive and negative values.  We calculate 
board alpha for the full board and for the outside directors only.  Individual director’s alpha is 
computed using four-factor models (Fama and French 1992, 1993 and Carhart, 1997).  We 
compute the board alpha by averaging the alphas of all (outside) board members to obtain  the 
full board (outside directors) alpha. Panel A shows the mean (median) board alphas and their 
standard deviations for both full board and outside directors calculated using an equally-
weighted index. The average alpha for the full board is 0.00104, and the average alpha for 
outside directors is slightly higher and is reported as 0.00116.  However, both full board alpha 
and outside director alpha have a high standard deviation (.0114 and .0159, respectively) 
depicting large variability in excess returns.  In unreported tests, we find similar results 
employing a value-weighted index.  
In Panel B we examine the difference in firm performance segregated by the 
contribution of the board members.  Barras, Scaillet, and Wermers (2010) define skilled and 
                                                          
4
 While some firms have very large director ownership, which skews the distribution, the median total 
director ownership in our sample is just under 3%. 
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unskilled mutual fund managers as those with positive and negative alphas.  Using their 
definition of skill (or contribution), we segregate boards with positive and negative alpha and 
examine the difference in Tobin’s q.  In Table 2, when we segregate by positive and negative 
alpha, we see that more than half of the firms in our sample have a high value board.  Table 2 
also reports that Tobin’s q is significantly higher for firms with positive alpha boards.   These 
results hold for alphas created using equally-weighted  measures, for full board and for the 
outside directors. For example, high value boards display a median Tobin’s q of 1.459, while 
their non-high value counterparts show a value of 1.347.  This finding gives preliminary evidence 
that higher alpha boards are associated with improved firm performance and is supportive of 
the Director Contribution Hypothesis.     
  
2.4 Determinants of director alpha 
If positive alpha directors are valuable, we are interested in identifying the director 
characteristics that are associated with this measure of contribution.  To explore this, we 
conduct several tests.  First, we examine the frequency of positive alphas based on several 
director characteristics that have been previously explored in the extant literature.  As 
examples, Antia, Pantzalis, and Park (2010) and Cline and Yore (2011) have shown that 
managerial age is an important input factor for determining firm performance, and Adams and 
Ferreira (2008) suggest that female directors are better monitors.  We also examine a director’s 
primary employment title as an independent variable, as we expect Chairmen, CEOs, and CFOs 
of the firms to have the experience, connection/network and wisdom to perform the monitoring 
and advising roles well.  Studies have posited that directors with primary employment in 
financial services (banks, mutual funds, and insurance companies) may provide enhanced 
monitoring, advising and overseeing functions because of their access to sources of finance 
(Guner et al., 2008, Shivdasani and Yermack, 1999).  Consultants and lawyers provide the board 
with valuable specific knowledge and can guide management in making prudent decisions.  We 
also examine various education variables since directors having advanced education (Ph.D.) and 
business education (MBA/CPA) may add value to the firm performance with their depth of 
knowledge and exposure to business literature.   
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We first examine the frequency of skilled directors (those with a positive alpha) within 
each of the director characteristics.  We also provide the correlation of these traits (or roles) 
with a positive alpha.  These results are in Table 3, Panel A. We see that directors who are 
Chairmen of the Board, CEOs, and MBA/CPA are significantly positively associated with positive 
alphas while CFOs, and those involved in financial services are negatively associated with 
positive alphas.  These results give us an initial picture of the traits most commonly associated 
with skilled directors.   
Given that the sign of the alpha coefficient takes on a special significance, we are keen 
to uncover which characteristics yield outperformance or underperformance. To further 
investigate this relation, we estimate a logistic regression of positive alpha on director 
characteristics: 
Positive Alpha  = 
β 0 +β1 Director Age + β2 Executive or CEO + β3 MBA/CPA + β4 Ph.D. + 
 β5 Financial Services+ β6 Consultant +  β7 Lawyer + β7 Busy 
(2) 
 
[Insert Table 3] 
Panel B of Table 3 reports the logistic regression results of the estimation of equation 
(2).  We find that older, more experienced directors and executives, specifically CEOs are more 
likely to be high value ones.  Confirming the preliminary evidence in Panel A, those directors 
trained in business or accounting (MBA/CPA) also appear to contribute.  Other characteristics do 
not add to the contribution level of directors. In particular, busy directors are not statistically 
associated with positive alphas.  This finding is not surprising given the evidence in Table 2 that 
busy directors are about equally likely to have a positive or a negative alpha.   
 
3. Director contribution, director busyness, and firm value 
3.1  Announcement returns of high alpha directors 
As documented in Table 2, director alpha, the measure of director contribution, is 
positively related to Tobin’s q.  We document that boards with high positive alpha have higher 
Tobin’s q compared to boards with negative alpha.  While Tobin’s q measures firm performance 
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over a one-year period, we are also interested to know how the market reacts to the 
appointment of these high value directors.  As outlined in the Director Appointment Hypothesis, 
we expect that the market would welcome the addition of a high value director. To test this 
hypothesis we conduct an event study around the date of director appointment by calculating 
the abnormal announcement returns using standard methodology (Brown and Warner, 1985).  
We then examine the characteristics related to the announcement returns by estimating the 
following: 
CAR (-1,+1) = 
β0 +β1 Director Alpha+ β2 Full Board Alphat-1 + β3 Director Alpha*Full 
Board Alphat-1 +β4 Makes board independent + +β5 CEO on Nominating 
Committeet-1 + β6 Busy board t-1 + β7 Log of Salet-1 
(3) 
 
Our sample period has 2,956 unique new director appointments. A new director 
appointment is coined “unique” if a director is appointed to a firm’s board for the first time.  
Following the extant literature we use the dependent variable as 3-day (-1 to +1) cumulative 
abnormal returns of the stock around director appointment where 0 is the announcement date.  
We use various independent variables in three separate models to determine which 
characteristics are associated with the CAR around the announcement date.  We estimate 
equation (3) for the full sample of director appointments and for the subsamples of skilled 
(positive alpha) and unskilled (negative alpha) directors.  Director alpha is our main variable of 
concern. Full board alpha, on the other hand, is the average alpha of the entire board in the 
previous year.  We include this variable since we conjecture that a positive alpha director can 
only be expected to contribute positively to the firm value if the board contains peers with high 
director alpha.  Therefore, we also use an interaction term involving director alpha and full 
board alpha to measure the incremental market reaction to the appointment of a new director 
in the existing board.  We justify using this interaction variable as firms almost never realize a 
wholesale change of directors.  Therefore a director’s contribution can only be adequately 
judged in relation to her incumbent fellow board members.  We conjecture that a director 
appointment which results in the board becoming  independent  will garner a higher positive 
market reaction and therefore we utilize the variable makes board independent to test our 
conjecture.  We expect a positive and statistically significant coefficient on this variable.  We 
also include a variable, CEO on nominating committee which proxies for CEO entrenchment.  We 
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expect the market to react negatively in such instances.  We also include busy board since the 
extant literature suggests busy boards are detrimental to firm value (Fich and Shivdasani, 2006).   
We also control for the size of the firm (log of sales)  as well as year and industry fixed effects.        
[Insert Table 4] 
Our findings are in Table 4.  Panel A presents the findings for all director 
announcements while Table B presents the findings for positive and negative alpha directors.  
Interestingly, for the full sample, we find that the alpha of the individual director is not 
significantly related to the investor reaction at her appointment. This is probably due to the fact 
that, at the median firm, the appointed director is but one voice in a room of ten. However, the 
interaction of director alpha with the full board alpha is positive and significant.  This finding 
suggests that the impact on the announcement returns is captured by joint influence of the 
director and board alpha. Thus, investors do not predict that any one high alpha director joining 
the board will have a substantial effect on firm value, but a high alpha director joining an 
existing effective board will enhance shareholder wealth. 
We also observe that a director appointment which results in an independent board is 
welcomed by investors.    These two results give strong support for our Director Appointment 
Hypothesis.  Other independent variables in our regression have expected signs.  We find that 
the presence of the CEO on the nominating committee is negatively related to the 
announcement return.  This finding suggests that the negative impact of CEO entrenchment 
cannot be overcome by the appointment of a director, even a high value one.    
 To further examine the results in Panel A, we segregate the sample into high value and 
non-high value directors.  In Panel B of Table 4, we show that the Panel A results are primarily 
driven by the high value directors.  The interaction of director alpha and board alpha and makes 
board independent are only significantly positive for firms with new high value directors.  More 
importantly, the possible harm that a busy board can cause a firm is erased as shown by the 
positive announcement when the board appoints a high value director.  These results give 
further support for our Director Appointment Hypothesis.   
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3.2 Relation of director contribution to firm value 
In this section, we examine the relation between our measure of director contribution 
(alpha) and firm value.  The Director Contribution Hypothesis suggests that good directors, as 
measured by their performance contribution to other firms, should be associated with higher 
firm value. We therefore estimate the following:  
Industry 
Adjusted Tobin’s 
Q  = 
β 0 +β1 Board Alpha + β2 LogBoardSize + β3 Independent board + 
 β4  Outside DirectorOwnership +  + β5 CEO tenure  +  β6 CEO 
Ownership+ β7 Log SALE+ β8 Capex/SALE+ β9 ROA + β10 ROA t-1+ β11 
Segments 
(4) 
 
We proxy for higher firm value by Industry Adjusted Tobin’s Q.  The independent variables used 
in the regression include two different measures of alpha - Full board alpha and Percentage of 
directors with positive alpha on the board.  We expect both the variables to be positively related 
to firm value.  Board size reports the number of directors on the board and is expected to have a 
negative relation with Tobin’s q (Yermack, 1996).  We control for the quality of the board with 
Independent board and Outside director ownership.    We expect both measures to be positively 
related to Tobin’s q since outside directors are less susceptible to direct agency costs of the firm 
and their stock ownership aligns their interests with those of the investors.   We also control for 
CEO characteristics.  CEO tenure, a measure of entrenchment is expected to be negatively 
related to firm value; CEO ownership, which aligns their interests with those of the firm, is 
expected to improve firm value.  We include several firm characteristics.  SALE represents the 
size of the firm; larger firms have been shown to have higher Tobin’s Q (Dadalt et al., 2003 and 
Yermack, 1996).  Myers (1977) and Smith and Watts (1992) suggest that firm value is dependent 
upon investment opportunities.  Therefore we include Capital expenditure to sale and expect a 
positive relation.  As shown by Yermack (1996), firms with high Return on Assets (ROA) are 
expected to have higher market to book ratio due to higher profitability.  However lagged ROA 
may have an opposite effect as market expectations created by previously high ROA might not 
be reached and result in lower stock prices, and therefore, lower market to book ratio.  We 
control for the diversity of the firm by the number of business segments.  Firms with a large 
number of business segments are less concentrated in the core activity and generally larger in 
size.  Lang and Stulz (1994) find that diversified firms are associated with lower Tobin’s q and 
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therefore we expect the market to book ratio to be lower for firms with larger number of 
business segments.  We also include year fixed effects.                  
[Insert Table 5] 
Table 5 presents the results of the estimation of equation (4).    We use full board alpha 
in Model 1 and percentage of directors with positive alpha in Model 3.  In both models, the 
measure of director contribution is positive and statistically highly significant, providing strong 
support of the Director Contribution Hypothesis.  Consistent with Yermack (1996), board size is 
negatively related to Tobin’s q yet director ownership is positively related, suggesting that 
ownership aligns directors with firm interests.  As expected, larger firms, more profitable firms, 
and those with high CEO ownership are associated with greater firm value while those with a 
greater number of business segments face lower values.  Our findings in Table 5 support the 
Director Contribution Hypothesis, that high alpha directors are associated with improved firm 
value.  Across both models, using two different measures of alpha, we find that higher positive 
board alpha is positively related to higher firm value.  The relationship is statistically significant 
after controlling for different firm characteristics, profitability, board and director 
characteristics.   
3.3 CEO Turnover and Board alpha 
For director alpha to be an accurate measure of contribution, boards with higher full board 
alpha should exhibit better monitoring skills than boards with lower alpha.  A standard measure 
of monitoring is the sensitivity of CEO turnover to firm performance. (Faleye et al., 2011; 
Coughlan and Schmidt, 1985; Warner et al., 1988; and Weisbach, 1988).  For director alpha to be 
an objective measure, we examine if board alpha influences CEO turnover.  We address this 
issue by examining whether board alpha in conjunction with firm performance has any influence 
on CEO turnover.  We expect that boards with high alphas will demonstrate higher quality 
monitoring through CEO turnovers when firm performance is poor.    We estimate the following 
logistic regression:  
CEO 
Turnover (1,0)  = 
β 0 +β1 Market-adjusted Returnt-1 + β2 Full Board Alphat-1 + β3 Full Board  
Alphat-1 *Market-adjusted Returnt-1 + β4 LogBoardSizet-1 +                             (5) 
 β5 Independent boardt-1  + β6  Outside DirectorOwnershipt-1 +   
β7 BusyBoardt-1 + β8 CEO tenuret-1  +  β9 CEO Ownershipt-1+  
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β9 Log SALEt-1 + β1 CEO 65 or oldert-1 
 
  
Table 6 provides the results of the estimation of equation (5).  In the estimation, the 
dependent variable takes a value of 1 if the CEO leaves office during the year and the value of 0 
otherwise.  We use 1-year lagged explanatory variables in all the logistic regressions as the firm 
performance is assumed to be measured on an annual basis. Our dependent variables have 
been defined previously.  In our sample of 10,586 firm-year observations, there are 1,082 CEO 
turnovers.  In model 1 consistent with previous evidence on CEO turnover (Weisbach, 1988; 
Parrino, 1997), we find that CEOs are more likely to leave their jobs when firm performance is 
poor.  In model 2 we introduce the board alpha and an interaction term of firm performance 
and board alpha as explanatory variables.  The results show that poorly performing CEOs are 
more likely to leave their jobs in presence of a high alpha board. We introduce explanatory 
variables to control for CEO, board and firm characteristics in Model 3 and find the results 
confirming the findings from model 2.  Based on the joint significance of the interaction term 
and the stand-alone coefficient for Market adjusted return in model 3, we can infer that higher 
board alpha significantly heightens the probability of CEO turnover because of poor 
performance.  In terms of the marginal effects implied by our coefficient estimates in model 3, 
for all firms in our sample, a one standard deviation decrease in Market adjusted returns 
increases the probability of CEO turnover by 0.09 percentage points.  The results hold even 
when we control for CEO stock ownership and CEO tenure.  A high value board, demonstrated 
by higher board alpha, is able to perform its monitoring duty irrespective of CEO entrenchment 
and other firm characteristics.   
[Insert Table 6] 
 
 
4. Conclusion 
Shareholders expect directors to monitor and advise firm executives.  Identifying 
directors who can contribute to firm value is therefore important.  Prior literature has suggested 
 - 57 - 
 
that a director’s value can be measured by his occupation, gender, number of directorships, and 
other director-specific traits.  However, given the noisy nature of these characteristics, it is not 
surprising that the extant literature is inconclusive about director value.  Using Director alpha as 
a measure of a board member’s contribution, we find that the market rewards firms that 
appoint such directors, consistent with our Director Appointment Hypothesis.  Moreover, for the 
typical firm, our parameter estimates imply that replacing a negative alpha director with a 
positive one is associated with a 3.3% improvement in firm value, supporting our Director 
Contribution Hypothesis.  Our findings fulfill the need for a more objective measure of director 
contribution.   
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Figure 1 
Timing of Alpha Estimations 
The figure below demonstrates how the individual overall director alpha is estimated for a director that 
serves on Firm A’s board from January 2000 until December 2000. That director’s own-board alpha is 
computed for the prior year as indicated by αA. If the director serves on three other boards with annual 
meeting dates in October, November, and April, the timing of the outside board alphas computed for 
the other outside directorships are indicated by αB, αC, and αD, respectively.  For this director, “Director 
Alpha” at Firm A is the average of the outside board alphas at Firms B, C, and D.   
 
 
 
  αA   Board Svc   
    
 
 
 
  αB    
    
 
 
 
  αC    
    
 
 
 
 αD     
    
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Dec 2000 Dec 1997 Dec 1999 Dec 1998 Dec 2001 
Oct 2001 Oct 2000 Oct 1997 Oct 1998 Oct 1999 
Nov 1997 Nov 1998 Nov 2001 Nov 2000 Nov 1999 
Apr 2002 Apr 2001 Apr 1998 Apr 1999 Apr 2000 
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Table 1: Data Description 
Panel A provides descriptive statistics for characteristics of our sample firms. The sample consists of 10,586 
firm-year observations for S&P 1500 companies between 1998 and 2008.  Capex/Sale and ROA (Net 
Income/Total Assets) are ratios. Tobin's Q is calculated following Kaplan and Zingales (1997) where Q = (BV of 
Assets-BV of Equity-Deferred Taxes+MV of Equity)/BV of Assets. Industry-adjusted Tobin's Q is calculated by 
subtracting the median Q value of all firms that reside in the same Fama and French (1997) 48-industry 
category. Panel B shows the characteristics of the boards of the sample firms and the 112,000 directors 
employed in those boards during 1998 to 2008 time period. Outside directors are defined as those that are not 
current or former employees of the firm, are not related to CEO, have no other business deals with the firm 
other than their directorship, and do not have interlocking directorships with the CEO of the respective firm. 
Boards with more than 50% outside directors are independent boards. Busy outside directors are defined as 
those outside directors holding three or more directorships simultaneously in the year of observation. Board 
services in private firms, not-for-profit organizations and/or charitable organizations are not considered in 
determination of the busy directors. Busy boards are defined as boards where 50% or more directors are busy.  
Full board average alpha is the average director alpha of the constituent directors in a board. Panel C shows the 
CEO characteristics of our sample firms. CEO tenure is the number of years the CEO has held the position in the 
firm until the year of observation. CEO in nominating committee is a binomial variable (1,0) which takes a value 
of 1 when the CEO is in the committee for nominating new board members.       
 
Mean Median Standard Deviation 
Panel A : Firm Characteristics 
            Age (years) 31.88 29 20.61 
Total Assets ($M) 19094.62 2478.8 86937.58 
Sales ($M) 7013.31 1942.71 18125.85 
Number of Segments 2.5 2.0 1.54 
 Tobin's q (Kaplan-Zingales, 1997) 1.868 1.438 1.353 
Industry-adjusted Tobin's q (Kaplan-Zingales, 1997) 0.3461 1.2414 0.0300 
Capex/Sale 7.76 3.93 24.45 
ROA (%) 3.30 4.13 13.72 
Panel B: Board Characteristics 
   Size 9.87 10 2.77 
Director Age 57.49 58.00 6.94 
Outside Directors (%) 69.72 71.42 15.75 
Director Ownership (%) 8.15 2.74 14.23 
Inside Director Ownership (%) 4.67 1.36 9.72 
Outside Director Ownership (%) 1.23 0.27 4.20 
Independent Board (%) 82.91 100 37.64 
Busy Board (%)  5.88 0 23.53 
Busy Outside Directors (%) 14.89 12.5 16.91 
Full Board average Alpha  0.00104 0.0073 0.0114 
% of Directors with Positive alpha on board 22.83 20 17.23 
Panel C: CEO Characteristics 
   Age  (years) 55.96 56 6.98 
Tenure (years) 7.09 5.04 6.73 
Ownership (%) 1.8 0.25 5.11 
CEO in Nominating Committee (%) 7.98 0 27.1 
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Table 2: Properties of Board Alpha 
Panel A presents the distribution of board alpha in our sample of 10,586 firms. We calculate board alpha for the full board and for 
the outside directors. Each individual director’s alpha is computed using Fama-French 4-factor models [Fama and French (1992, 
1993); Carhart (1997)],. We compute the board alpha by averaging the alphas of all (outside) board members to get full board 
(outside directors) alpha. Panel A shows the mean (median) board alphas and their standard deviations for both full board and 
outside directors calculated using equally-weighted index. Panel B depicts the relation of board alphas with Tobin's q and board 
busyness. Tobin's q is calculated following Kaplan and Zingales (1997):  q = (BV of Assets-BV of Equity-Deferred Taxes+MV of 
equity)/BV of Assets. Panel B shows the frequency of positive alpha and negative alpha boards in our sample firms. It also depicts 
relations between Tobin's q and mean (median) positive alpha and mean (median) negative alpha boards. The last column on the 
right reports the p-values for the differences in Tobin's q for different values of alpha. Panel B reports the frequency and univariate 
relation between positive (and negative) alpha boards and busyness of the board. A full board is coined busy if 50% or more of its 
constituent directors sit on three or more boards. The last three rows in Panel B report the frequency and mean (median) 
differences in positive and negative alpha boards for the % of busy outside directors. p-values for the differences are reported in 
the right column. 
Panel A:  Properties of Board Alpha 
 Full Board Outside directors  
Board Alpha (%) 0.00104 (0.00073) 0.00116 (0.00073) 
 Standard Deviation 0.0114 0.0159 
   N       10,586    10,586 
Panel B:  Univariate tests of board alpha with Tobin's q and busyness 
 
Alpha > 0 Alpha <0 p-value of difference 
Performance 
    Full Board 
    Frequency 5033 4152 
  Tobin's q 1.897 (1.459) 1.833 (1.347) 0.0214 (0.0236) 
Outside Directors 
    Frequency 4944 4241 
  Tobin's q 1.894 (1.454) 1.839 (1.417) 0.0363 (0.0535) 
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Table 3: Determinants of Director Alpha 
Table 3 presents director characteristics of 3,120 new directors appointed in our sample of firms during 
1998 to 2008. Column 1 in Panel A reports the frequency (percentage) of positive alpha directors, 
calculated using equally-weighted Fama-French 4 factor market model [Fama and French (1992, 1993); 
Carhart (1997)].  Column 2 reports the correlation of director attribute with the incidence of positive 
alpha director.  The director attributes considered here are his primary title (Executive, Chair, CEO, Dual, 
CFO), his status of higher education (MBA/CPA, PhD), his primary occupation (Financial services, 
Consultant, or Lawyer), and if he is busy (holds three or more board seats). p-values for the correlation 
coefficients are presented in parentheses. Panel B shows the results of a logistic regression where 
dependent variable takes a value of one if newly appointed director has positive alpha. The independent 
variables are Age of the director, his primary title, his status of highrer education, his primary occupation, 
and if he is busy. Both models 1 and 2 show regressions on director alpha=1 computed using equally-
weighted Fama-French 4 factor models.  p-values for the coefficients are reported in parentheses. 
 
Panel A: Correlation of Director Characteristics and Positive Alpha 
 
(1) (2) 
 
Frequency (%)   of  
positive alpha 
Correlation with 
 positive alpha  
Director is: 
  
   Executive 1,294 0.00702 
 
(41.42) (0.6950) 
Chair 348 0.08319 
 
(54.63)  (<.0001) 
CEO 473 0.07645 
 
(57.26)  (<.0001) 
Dual 300 0.0583 
 
(55.97) (0.0011) 
CFO 18 -0.05323 
 
(50.00) (0.0087) 
MBA/CPA 497 0.03857 
 
(57.32) (0.0311) 
PhD 127 -0.01102 
 
(53.59) (0.5382) 
Financial Services 140 -0.0164 
 
(57.61) (0.3595) 
Consultant 48 -0.02035 
 
(55.81) (0.2556) 
Lawyer 23 0.02838 
 
(79.31) (0.1127) 
Busy 44 0.0111 
 
(52.38) (0.5350) 
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Panel B: Determinants of high value directors 
 
Dependent variable: Positive Director Alpha = 1 
 
(1) (2) 
Constant -2.6624 -2.6736 
 
(<.0001) (<.0001) 
Age 0.0348 0.0334 
 
(<.0001) (<.0001) 
Executive 0.272 
 
 
(0.011) 
 CEO 
 
0.4513 
  
(0.0001) 
MBA/CPA 0.1908 0.1924 
 
(0.0436) (0.0784) 
PhD -0.0724 -0.0277 
 
(0.6468) (0.8821) 
Financial Services -0.0227 -0.0896 
 
(0.8913) (0.6603) 
Consultant -0.0362 -0.415 
 
(0.8641) (0.1369) 
Lawyer 1.1212 0.9309 
 
(0.0018) (0.025) 
Busy 0.5716 0.6864 
 
(0.1886) (0.1267) 
   Chi-square 40.85 41.3336 
 
 (<0.0001)  (<0.0001) 
N 3124 3124 
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Table 4: Market Reaction to Director Appointments 
Table 4 shows the determinants of stock price reaction to appointment of new directors on the board. There are 2,956 unique new director appointments 
in our sample firms. In this table, the dependent variable is 3-day (-1 to +1) cumulative abnormal return around director appointment where 0 is the 
announcement date. The independent variables are as follows.  Director alpha is the individual director's alpha calculated using Fama-French 4-factor 
equally weighted model [Fama and French (1992, 1993); Carhart (1997)] for all the boards s/he sits on. Full board alpha is the average alpha of the full 
board calculated using Fama-French 4-factor equally weighted model. Makes board independent takes a value of one if the appointment of the director 
turns the board into a majority of ouside directors. CEO on nominating comm is a binomial variable which takes a value of one if the CEO sits on the 
nominating committee for selecting directors. Busy board is a binomial variable which takes a value of one if 50% or more of the directors currently sit on 
three or more boards. p-values for each of the coefficients are reported in parentheses. Panel A shows the regression on CAR which includes all new 
director appointments. Panel B shows the results of similar regressions on positive alpha directors and negative alpha directors separately. All the 
regressions are controlled for year and industry. 
Panel A: Market reaction to all new directors  
 
Dependent variable: CAR (-1, +1) 
 
(1) (2) (3) 
 Intercept 0.00245 0.00233 0.00347 
 
 
(0.0043) (0.0074) (0.6045) 
 Director Alpha -0.0036 -0.03544 -0.0359 
 
 
(0.9079) (0.2825) (0.2756) 
 Full Board Alpha (t-1) 
  
0.05269 0.0663 
 
   
(0.5364) (0.4388) 
 Director Alpha*Full Board Alpha (t-1) 
  
8.71081 8.6496 
 
   
(0.0032) (0.00344) 
 Makes board independent 
    
0.0095 
 
     
(0.0053) 
 CEO in Nominating Comm (t-1) 
    
-0.0069 
 
     
(0.0396) 
 Board is busy (t-1) 
    
0.001 
 
Director is Busy 
    
(0.7302) 
0.0056 
(0.2213) 
 
 
log Sales (t-1) 
    
-0.00018 
 
     
(0.802) 
 
        F Value 0.01 3.52 3.07 
 
 
(0.9079) (0.0145) (0.0019) 
 R-Square 0.000006  0.004526  0.0105 
 N 2328 2328 2328 
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Panel B: Differing market reaction to Positive Alpha directors  
 
 
                                          Dependent variable: CAR (-1, +1) 
 
Director alpha > 0  Director alpha< 0  
 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 Intercept -0.0007 0.00009 0.013 0.0027 0.00279 -0.0064 
 
 
(0.7200) (0.9628) (0.261) (0.159) (0.1556) (0.588) 
 Director Alpha 0.0659 0.00951 -0.0043 -0.01 -0.02260 -0.026 
 
 
(0.2354) (0.8780) (0.95) (0.875) (0.7278) (0.687) 
 Full Board Alpha (t-1) 
 
0.01115 0.0519 
 
-0.00848 0.0072 
 
  
(0.9468) (0.7554) 
 
(0.9700) (0.975) 
 Director Alpha*Full Board Alpha (t-1) 
 
8.23735 8.177 
 
9.45729 9.035 
 
  
(0.0615) (0.0614) 
 
(0.2531) (0.277) 
 Makes board independent 
  
0.021 
  
0.0086 
 
   
 ( <.0001) 
  
(0.1712) 
 CEO in Nominating Comm (t-1) 
  
-0.013 
  
-0.0077 
 
   
(0.009) 
  
(0.182) 
 Board is busy (t-1) 
  
0.0055 
  
0.0033 
  
Director is busy 
 
  
(0.23) 
  
(0. 474) 
 
0.009 0.0004 
(0.193) (0.952) 
log Sales (t-1) 
  
-0.0016 
  
0.001 
 
   
(0.206) 
  
(0.455) 
 
   
  
    F Value 1.41 2.54 4.27 0.02 0.84 0.92 
 
 
(0.2354) (0.0553) (<0.0001) (0.875) (0.4717) (0.498) 
 R-Square 0.001535 0.008255 0.036 0.000034 0.003416 0.01 
 N 919 919 919 740 740 740 
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Table 5: Board Alpha and Long term firm performance 
This table shows the relation between firm performance, measured by industry-adjusted Tobin's q (Kaplan 
and Zingales, 1997), and director alpha. The dependent variable in this OLS regression model is Tobin's q 
representing firm value.  Two major explanatory variables are Full board average alpha and % of Full boards 
with positive alpha. Full board average alpha is average board alpha of the firm-year in observation calculated 
using Fama-French 4-factor equally-weighted market model [Fama and French (1992, 1993); Carhart 
(1997)].The variable % of directors with positive alpha on the board is the proportion of board members with 
a positive director alpha. Other independent variables are used as controls and their definitions follow. Log 
board size is log of the number of directors sitting on the board. Independent board (1,0) takes on a value of 
one when 50% or more of the directors on the board are outside directors. Outside director ownership 
represent the stock ownership of the said group. Busy board (1,0) takes on a value of one if 50% or more of 
constituent directors hold three or more board seats. CEO tenure and CEO ownership represent the number 
of years the CEO has held the position in the firm and his ownership of common stock of the firm respectively. 
Firm characteristics are proxied by log sale, Capex/Sale. ROA reflects firm profitability and  # of segments is 
the number of business and/or operating segments representing firm complexity. Each model controls for 
year and industry. The p-values for the coefficients are presented in the parentheses. 
 
 
Dependent variable: Industry Adjusted Tobin’s Q 
 (1) (2) 
Intercept 1.0329 1.066 
 
(<.0001) (<.0001) 
Board Characteristics: 
  Full Board average Alpha  2.8911 
 
 
(0.011) 
 % of Directors with Positive alpha 
on board 
 
0.283 
  
(0.0009) 
Log Board Size -0.4508 -0.452 
 
(<.0001) (<.0001) 
Independent Board (1,0) 0.0217 0.0082 
 
(0. 577) (0.835) 
Outside Director Ownership  (% of 
common stocks) 0.0028 0.003 
 
(0.237) (0.191) 
   CEO Characteristics: 
  CEO Tenure -0.0016 -0.0013 
 
(0.43) (0.526) 
CEO Ownership (% of common 
stocks) 0.0038 0.0039 
 
(0.301) (0.299) 
Firm Characteristics: 
  log Sale 0.0374 0.0278 
 
(0.0007) (0.0149) 
Capex/Sale 0.0726 0.0695 
 
(0.1767) (0.1954) 
Return on Assets 2.2159 2.2183 
 
(<.0001) (<.0001) 
Return on Assets (t-1) 0.6955 0.698 
 
(<.0001) (<.0001) 
# of Business segments -0.0903 -0.0911 
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(<.0001) (<.0001) 
Table 5, continued 
 
Year (0,1) indicators Yes yes 
   F Value 48.03 48.29 
 
(<.0001) (<.0001) 
R-square 0.1029 0.1034 
N 8391 8391 
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Table 6: Board Alpha and CEO Turnover 
This table shows the relation between CEO turnover, firm performance, measured by market adjusted return), 
and board alpha. The dependent variable in this logistic regression model is CEO turnover which takes a value of 1 
if the CEO leaves office during the year, 0 otherwise. All the explanatory variables are lagged by 1 year. Market-
adjusted return is the return of the stock of the firm in the previous year. Full board average alpha is average 
board alpha of the firm-year in observation calculated using Fama-French 4-factor equally-weighted market 
model. Interaction variable is created by using Interaction = Market adjusted Return (t-1)* Full board average 
alpha. Other independent variables are used as controls and their definitions follow. Log board size is log of the 
number of directors sitting on the board. Independent board (1,0) takes on a value of one when 50% or more of 
the directors on the board are outside directors. Outside director ownership represent the stock ownership of the 
said group. Busy board (1,0) takes on a value of one if 50% or more of constituent directors hold three or more 
board seats. CEO tenure and CEO ownership represent the number of years the CEO has held the position in the 
firm and his ownership of common stock of the firm respectively. Firm size is proxied by log sale. Each model 
controls for year and industry. The p-values for the coefficients are presented in the parentheses. 
 
Dependent variable: CEO Turnover = 1 
 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
Constant -1.928 -1.929 -2.563 
 
(<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) 
Market adjusted Return (t-1) -0.4167 -0.4047 -0.3933 
 
(<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) 
Full board alpha (t-1)  -1.386 -0.0834 
 
 (0.655) (0.9795) 
Market adjusted Return (t-1) * Full board alpha (t-1)  
-12.65 -13.525 
 
 (0.0784) (0.0810) 
log Board Size (t-1)   0.0112 
 
  (0.3869) 
Independent Board (t-1) (1,0)   0.0798 
 
  (0.4282) 
Outside Director Ownership  (% of common stocks)   0.0034 
 
  (0.5277) 
Board is busy (t-1)   0.1566 
 
  (0.2555) 
CEO Ownership (% of common stocks) (t-1)   -0.0208 
 
  (0.0178) 
CEO age > 65 (t-1)   1.122 
 
  (<.0001) 
log Sale (t-1)   0.0109 
 
  (0.6686) 
Interaction term + Market adjusted Return (t-1) 
  
-12.733 
   
(0.087) 
Industry Indicators yes yes yes 
Year indicators yes yes yes 
Likelihood ratio p-value <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 
N (CEO Turnover) 8860 (1082) 8860 (1082) 8860 (1082) 
 
